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INTRODUCTION
Within months after U.S. President George W. Bush declared the end
of"[m]ajor combat operations" in Iraq on May 1, 2003,1 Kurdish forces
captured Hiwa Abdul Rahman Rashul on the territory of coalition-
occupied Iraq, transferred him to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
custody, and then the CIA transported him to Afghanistan for interroga-
tion.2 Rashul's transfer shares many characteristics with extraordinary
renditions authorized by President Bush and conducted worldwide by
the CIA as part of the so-called "war on terror," 3 but his transfer is dis-
tinguished from most others because it directly implicates the humani-
tarian law of occupation under the Geneva Conventions.4 This Article
1. Address to the Nation on Iraq from the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 516, 516 (May 1, 2003), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/v39nol8.html.
2. See Dana Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees out of Iraq; Practice is Called Serious
Breach of Geneva Conventions, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2004, at Al. Rashul was returned to Iraq
on October 29, 2003. See Edward T. Pound, Iraq"s Invisible Man, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
June 28, 2004, at 32. As of October 2004, his status was unknown. See Priest, supra.
3. See David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights
Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123, 123-25, 127 (2006); see also David Johnston, C.I.A. Tells
of Bush's Directive on the Handling of Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006 (reporting that the
CIA has acknowledged the existence of a classified directive signed by President Bush soon after
September 11, 2001 which grants the CIA the authority to set up detention facilities outside of the
United States).
4. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Ge-
neva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S.
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concludes that Rashul's transfer, and an uncertain number of other trans-
fers from territory occupied by U.S. forces since 2001, 5 constitute grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and proposes several legal mecha-
nisms for addressing those grave breaches.
6
The Third Geneva Convention (Geneva POW Convention) governs
the treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs).7 Article 130 defines grave
breaches to include "any of the following acts, if committed against per-
sons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or
inhuman treatment,... [and] wilfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health.... 8 Article 131 establishes that no High Con-
tracting Party may absolve itself of liability with respect to grave
breaches. 9
The Fourth Geneva Convention (Geneva Civilian Convention) pro-
vides protection for civilians during war and occupation.10 Article 147
defines grave breaches to include, "any of the following acts, if commit-
ted against persons or property protected by the present Convention:
wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment,...wilfully causing great suf-
fering or serious injury to body or health, [and] unlawful deportation or
85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva POW Con-
vention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Civilian Convention].
5. See Priest, supra note 2.
6. A substantial gap in the analysis of the present article is the omission of a discussion of the
applicability of the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. See Proto-
col Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Vic-
tims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; see
also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2797 (2006) (opinion joined by four members of the
eight-justice panel) ("Many of the [trial protections that have been recognized by customary in-
ternational law] are described in Article 75 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
adopted in 1977 (Protocol I). Although the United States declined to ratify Protocol I, its objec-
tions were not to Article 75 thereof. Indeed, it appears that the Government 'regard[s] the provi-
sions of Article 75 as an articulation of safeguards to which all persons in the hands of an enemy
are entitled."' (quoting William H. Taft, IV, The Law ofArmed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient
Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 322 (2003))). As the Supreme Court suggests, much of Proto-
col I and parts of Protocol II are customary international humanitarian law, see Anthony Cullen,
Key Developments Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian
Law, 183 MIL. L. REV. 66, 88 n.85 (2005); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law
in Armed Conflict, 87 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 175, 187-90 (2005), but the United States is not a
party to the protocols, see Cullen, supra, at 88 n.85.
7. Geneva POW Convention, supra note 4.
8. Geneva POW Convention, supra note 4, art. 130.
9. See id. art. 131.
10. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4.
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transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person...."" As with the
Geneva POW Convention, Article 148 establishes that High Contracting
Parties may not absolve themselves of liability for grave breaches. 12
A useful framework for identifying grave breaches through applica-
tion of the Geneva Conventions is set forth in the following sequence of
questions:
(1) Is there an international armed conflict between two or
more High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions?
(2) Is there a partial or total occupation of the territory gov-
erned by the Geneva Conventions?
(3) If either of the above conditions is met, who is afforded
protected person status under the Conventions?
(4) What rights and protections are afforded to those protected
persons?1
3
The following four sections address each question in turn, consider-
ing both the conflict in Afghanistan and the conflict in Iraq. The fifth
section explores mechanisms to address these grave breaches, and the
conclusion discusses the broader implications of the government justifi-
cations for extraordinary rendition.
I. Is THERE AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN Two
OR MORE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES?
Article 2 is an article common to all four of the Geneva Conventions
11. Id. art. 147. Although Article 147 is referred to as an "Article common to the four conven-
tions," see INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, IV Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War 602 n. I (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinaf-
ter Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY], only the Fourth Geneva Convention includes as a grave
breach the "unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person." See
Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 147.
12. See Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 148.
13. For an example of application of a similar framework, see Marco Sassoli, Use and Abuse
of the Laws of War in the "War on Terrorism," 22 LAW & INEQ. 195 (2004). If neither of the
conditions in the first two questions is met, one should consider whether Common Article 3 ap-
plies to the conflict. The applicability of Common Article 3 to extraordinary rendition has been
discussed elsewhere. See Weissbrodt & Bergquist, supra note 3, at 151-53. For further discussion
of the applicability of Common Article 3 to the so-called "war on terror," see Hamdan v. Rums-
feld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795-97 (2006); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 162-63
(D.D.C. 2004); see also INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, III GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 34-37 (Jean S. Pictet ed.,
1958) [hereinafter Pictet, POW COMMENTARY]; LIESBETH ZEGVELD, ACCOUNTABILITY OF
ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 138-39 (2002); David Kretzmer, Targeted
Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16
EUR. J. INT'L L. 171, 195 (2005).
[Vol. 47:2
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and identifies situations in which the Conventions apply:
The present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war
or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is
not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply
to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no
armed resistance. 14
The primary argument advanced by the Bush administration is that
certain armed conflicts with certain combatants are outside of the scope
of the Geneva Conventions. A January 9, 2002, draft memorandum au-
thored by John Yoo and Robert Delahunty at the Justice Department's
Office of Legal Counsel first articulated this argument with regard to the
conflict in Afghanistan.' 5 The memorandum first argues that al Qaeda is
a non-state actor and not a party to the Geneva Conventions, and the
conflict between the United States and al Qaeda is therefore not gov-
erned by the Geneva Conventions. 16 The memorandum also contends
that Taliban members are not protected parties under the Geneva Con-
ventions because, while Afghanistan is a party to the Geneva Conven-
tions, the Taliban was not widely recognized as the defacto government
of the country. 17 Instead, they argue, Afghanistan was a "failed state"
and the Taliban could not properly invoke the protections of the Geneva
Conventions. 18 Most of these arguments were embraced in a subsequent
memorandum authored by then-White House Counsel Alberto Gonza-
14. E.g., First Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 2.
15. See Draft Memorandum from John Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty to William J. Haynes II,
General Counsel, Department of Defense, Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Tali-
ban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Yoo & Delahunty], in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE
ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 38 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE
TORTURE PAPERS].
16. See id. at 48-49.
17. See id. at 53.
18. See id. at 54-62. This argument would establish an ominous precedent and undermine the
entire foundation of humanitarian law, for many states initiate wars on the grounds that the gov-
ernment of the state they are attacking is illegitimate. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S.
Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J.
INT'L L. 275, 284 (1973) (describing Hitler's unilateral assertions in 1938 that the Czech govern-
ment's treatment of various nationalities constituted "madness," allegedly justifying German
"humanitarian intervention" in Czechoslovakia); Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under
International Law: A Gross Violation, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 293, 297 (1991) (noting that
U.S. officials justified the invasion of Panama on the grounds that the Noriega government was
illegitimate).
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les,' 9 and ultimately in a confidential memorandum issued by President
Bush on February 7, 2002.20
The Bush memorandum concludes that the Geneva POW Convention
"applies to conflicts involving 'High Contracting Parties,' which can
only be States."'', Bush concedes that the Geneva Conventions governed
the U.S. conflict with the Taliban in Afghanistan, in spite of Yoo & De-
lahunty's proposed "failed state" theory.22 Instead, he excludes the Tall-
ban detainees from protection under the Geneva POW Convention on
other grounds.23
The Bush administration has maintained that the Geneva Conven-
tions are "fully applicable" to the conflict in Iraq. 24 Beginning with the
U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the United States and Iraq, both
High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions, were engaged in
armed conflict. Gradually the U.S. and coalition forces began to occupy
regions of the country as the armed conflict continued. While it is un-
clear whether occupation has ended,25 one may argue that the Geneva
Conventions continue to apply to Iraq because they apply to conditions
of armed conflict, and their applicability only ceases "on the general
close of military operations." 26 Arguably, Iraq has yet to observe a "gen-
eral close of military operations; ' 27 hence, the Geneva Conventions may
19. Draft Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales to the President, Decision re Application
of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban
(Jan. 25, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 15, at 118.
20. Memorandum from George W. Bush to the Vice President et al., Humane Treatment of al
Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 15, at 134.
21. Id. at 134.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 134-35 ("1 determine that the provisions of Geneva will apply to our present
conflict with the Taliban.... I determine that the Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants and,
therefore, do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva."); see also Sean D. Mur-
phy, Decision Not to Regard Persons Detained in Afghanistan as POWs, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 475
(2002) (describing the broader context of this determination).
24. See Senior Military Official (unnamed), Interrogation Procedures and Detention Facilities
in Iraq, Defense Department Background Briefing in Pentagon Briefing Room, Arlington, Vir-
ginia (May 14, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/
tr20040514-0752.html ("From the very beginning of the conflict, the Geneva Conventions have
been fully applicable. There's never been any dispute about that, never any doubt. During the ini-
tial phase, it was an international armed conflict, to which the Geneva Conventions were applica-
ble. We are now in a state of legal occupation. The Geneva Conventions are applicable to that, as
well.").
25. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
26. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 6.
27. As of November 9, 2006, there have been 2,842 U.S. military casualties in Iraq. Anti-
War.com, Casualties in Iraq, (Michael Ewens ed.) available at http://www.antiwar.com/
casualties/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). Of those casualties, over ninety-five percent have oc-
[Vol. 47:2
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be in effect. A similar argument applies to Afghanistan, particularly in
light of the Supreme Court's recent observation that the U.S. armed con-
flict with the Taliban and al Qaeda is ongoing.28
This observation raises the issue of when the Geneva Conventions
cease to be in effect. While the Geneva Civilian Convention is fairly ex-
plicit, the authoritative 29 Commentary of Jean S. Pictet notes that it "is
the only one of the four Geneva Conventions which contains specific
provisions relating to the general cessation of its application. The other
Conventions contain clauses dealing with the moment when the Con-
vention ceases to apply to each individual protected person...."30 The
provisions of the Geneva POW Convention, for example, "apply to
[protected persons] from the time they fall into the power of the enemy
and until their final release and repatriation." 31 The Geneva Civilian
Convention contains a similar provision protecting detained or interred
individuals until they are released or repatriated.32 In situations of inter-
national armed conflict, the provisions relating to civilians who are not
detained cease to have effect on the general close of military opera-
tions.33 The Commentary to the Geneva Civilian Convention indicates
curred since President Bush announced the end of "major combat operations," and over sixty-nine
percent have occurred since Iraq assumed sovereignty. See id.
28. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2804 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[O]ur Na-
tion's armed conflict with the Taliban and al Qaeda... continues as we speak...."); Vance Ser-
chuk, Dutch Retreat?: The Perils of Turning Afghanistan over to NA TO, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan.
16, 2006, at 18 (describing 2005 as "the deadliest year for U.S. forces in Afghanistan since the
post-9/11 invasion" and noting that U.S. forces are advancing into areas of Afghanistan still con-
trolled by the Taliban); Remarks on the War on Terror in Arlington, Virginia, 42 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 5, 7 (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/v42no0l.html
(noting that in 2006 the number of international forces in Afghanistan will increase); CBS Eve-
ning News (CBS television broadcast Aug. 3, 2006) ("The war in Afghanistan has suddenly be-
come more intense...."). As of mid 2006, the United States had approximately 21,000 troops in
Afghanistan. See 4 Suicide Bombers Are Killed, CHI. TRIB., July 25, 2006, at CI 1. The govern-
ment intends to maintain its troop levels in the country. General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Defense Department Regular Briefing with Secretary of Defense Donald H.
Rumsfeld in Pentagon Briefing Room, Arlington, Virginia (Aug. 2, 2006), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptlD=3692.
29. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790 n.48 ("Though not binding law, the commentary is, as the
parties recognize, relevant in interpreting the Conventions' provisions."); see also id. at 2789-90,
2794 nn.57-58, 2795 n.62, 2796-97 & nn.63-64; 2832 (Thomas, J., dissenting), 2852, 2854
(Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Pictet's Commentary as an interpretive tool).
30. Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 59.
31. Geneva POW Convention, supra note 4, art. 5, para. 1.
32. See Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 4 ("Protected persons whose
release, repatriation or re-establishment may take place after such dates shall meanwhile continue
to benefit by the present Convention.").
33. Id. art. 6, para. 2 ("In the territory of Parties to the conflict, the application of the present
Convention shall cease on the general close of military operations.").
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that "in most cases the general close of military operations will be the
final end of all fighting between all those concerned. 34 Therefore, to
the extent that the parties have not yet observed a general close of mili-
tary operations, 35 the provisions of the Geneva Civilian Convention still
apply to Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, regardless of whether a gen-
eral close of military operations has occurred in Afghanistan or Iraq, the
Conventions also apply to persons who are still held under the power of
U.S. or coalition forces.
36
If at some point the original international armed conflicts in Afghani-
stan and Iraq did end, the Geneva Conventions would still apply based
on U.S. involvement with the armed conflicts against insurgents in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq. U.S. assistance to the current governments in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq in their armed conflicts with insurgencies suggest
that the present conflicts could constitute "internal armed conflicts that
have become 'internationalized' by virtue of... foreign assistance...."37
In this case, they would simply be "re-internationalized," in light of the
recognized international armed conflicts existing prior to the current in-
ternal armed conflicts. The involvement of an outside government fight-
ing on behalf of one party to a civil war arguably transforms that con-
flict into an international armed conflict. 38 During the Vietnam War, for
example, the United States insisted that it was not an occupying power,
and that it was present in the country at the invitation of the government
of South Vietnam.39 Nonetheless, the United States insisted on treating
all enemy combatants as prisoners of war,4° maintaining that the Geneva
Conventions were fully in force.41 By analogy, therefore, the Vietnam
War suggests that the full scope of the Conventions should apply to the
current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
34. Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 62.
35. See supra notes 27-28.
36. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
37. David Weissbrodt, The Role of International Organizations in the Implementation of Hu-
man Rights and Humanitarian Law in Situations ofArmed Conflict, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
313, 337 (1988); see also W. Michael Reisman & James Silk, Which Law Applies to the Afghan
Conflict?, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 459, 465 (1988) (rejecting the distinction between internal conflicts
and international wars as incompatible with the "thrust" of humanitarian law).
38. See George H. Aldrich, The Hague Peace Conferences: The Laws of War on Land, 94
AM. J. INT'L L. 42, 63 (2000).
39. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, Aggression from the North: The Record of North Vietnam's
Campaign to Conquer South Vietnam, Pub. No. 7839, Far Eastern Series 130, (Feb. 1965), re-
printed in VIETNAM: HISTORY, DOCUMENTS, AND OPINIONS ON A MAJOR WORLD CRISIS 286
(Marvin E. Gettleman ed., 1965).
40. See Aldrich, supra note 38, at 62.
41. See Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Book Note, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 900, 902 (1971) (reviewing
TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY (1970)).
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Some commentators have argued that the United States and al Qaeda
cannot possibly be "at war" under international law because wars only
exist either between states or between a state and a group that meets cer-
tain requirements of sovereignty.42 Because the Geneva Conventions
apply not only to "cases of declared war" but also to "any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, '43 for the purposes of the Convention it is irrelevant whether the
conflict constitutes a "war" per se. More important is the fact that, as a
non-state actor, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party.44 Therefore,
the provisions of the Geneva Conventions (other than Common Article
3) do not apply to the conflict between the United States and al Qaeda,
except to the extent that the conflict is part of another conflict between
High Contracting Parties, 45 such as the conflict between the United
States and the Taliban in Afghanistan, or the United States and Iraq prior
to occupation. 46 Members of al Qaeda may also receive protections un-
der the Geneva Civilian Convention, particularly during occupation.47
II. Is THERE A PARTIAL OR TOTAL OCCUPATION OF A TERRITORY
GOVERNED BY THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS?
The term "occupation" as it applies to the Geneva Civilian Conven-
tion is intentionally broad.48 A territory is occupied if forces control it.
49
42. See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1012 (2d
Cir. 1974) ("The cases establish that war is a course of hostility engaged in by entities that have at
least significant attributes of sovereignty."); Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28
YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 8 n.38 (2002) (collecting citations); Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military
Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 n. 16 (2001) (arguing that al Qaeda
has not met the "insurgent criteria" of controlling defined territory and having other characteris-
tics of a state).
43. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 1.
44. See LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 52 (2002) (stating that
non-state actors "have no capacity to become parties to the Conventions as such"); see also lain
Scobbie, Tom Franck's Fairness, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 909, 923 n.89 (2002) (describing the Pales-
tinian Liberation Organization's attempt to accede to the Geneva Conventions).
45. Cf Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795 (2006) (describing the Government's ar-
gument that "Hamdan was captured and detained incident to the conflict with al Qaeda and not
the conflict with the Taliban," and therefore the full Geneva Conventions presumably applicable
to the conflict with the Taliban in Afghanistan, a High Contracting Party, did not extend to Ham-
dan).
46. See also Joan Fitzpatrick, Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the Rule of Law, 25 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 303, 306 (2002) (noting that the characterization of the nature and scope
of the U.S. armed conflict in the "war on terrorism" is unclear and observing that each potential
characterization "implicate[s] [a] dramatically different international legal regime[]").
47. See infra notes 100-17 and accompanying text.
48. See Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 60; see also Adam Roberts, What is
a Military Occupation?, 55 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 249, 299-304 (1984) (contending that occupation
2007]
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Article 49 (which governs only during occupation) even applies to pa-
trols penetrating into enemy territory without any intention of staying.5 °
Because both Afghanistan and Iraq are High Contracting Parties, the
United States would be governed by the Geneva Civilian Convention
because of its obligations as an occupying power.5
Some commentators have stated that Afghanistan was, at some point,
occupied by U.S. forces. 52 The actions of U.S. forces confirm that those
forces were in control of at least parts of the country for some period of
time. 53 As demonstrated below, because Afghanistan arguably has yet to
under the Geneva Conventions is a broad term and should be construed so as to avoid placing
armed forces outside their home countries in "something of an international legal limbo"). The
Commentary indicates that the term is broader than the meaning of occupation under the Fourth
Hague Convention of 1907, which states, "Territory is considered occupied when it is actually
placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where
such authority has been established and can be exercised." Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land art. 42, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter
Hague Convention].
49. See Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 47.
50. See id. at 60. Given the Bush administration's characterization of the "global war on ter-
ror," the Geneva Convention's provisions governing occupation could arguably apply when CIA
forces enter a sovereign state to seize a terror suspect without permission of that state. See Craig
Whitlock, CIA Ruse Is Said to Have Damaged Probe in Milan, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2005, at Al
(describing CIA efforts to deceive Italian authorities when they seized Abu Omar in Milan).
51. The International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion in 2004 concluding that as
long as an occupation is subsequent to a conflict between two High Contracting Parties, it is ir-
relevant whether the occupied territory itself falls under the sovereignty of a High Contracting
Party. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 174 (July 9). For a thoughtful criticism of the court's
reasoning in this part of the opinion, see Ardi Imseis, Critical Reflections on the International
Humanitarian Law Aspects of the ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 102, 103-05
(2005). Because both Afghanistan and Iraq are High Contracting Parties, the present article does
not need to rely on the court's broad interpretation of Article 2.
52. See, e.g., Steve Sheppard, Propter Honoris Respectum: Passion and Nation: War, Crime,
and Guilt in the Individual and the Collective, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 751, 751 (2003) ("At the
time of this writing, U.S. soldiers guard the recently occupied capital of Afghanistan...."). The
United States has resisted being characterized as an occupying power. See Drew Brown, Official
Says More Troops Could Have Kept Fewer Terrorists from Escaping, KNIGHT RIDDER WASH.
BUREAU, June 27, 2002 ("The United States and its allies have been anxious to avoid being per-
ceived as foreign occupiers or invaders in Afghanistan."); cf Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of
Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 345, 349 (2002)
(contending that the United States deliberately chose not to occupy Afghanistan). The terms of
the conventions, however, do not allow the United States to decide whether it is an occupying
power. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. To permit a country to make such a unilat-
eral determination would undermine the provisions in the Civilian Convention governing the ac-
tions of the occupying power.
53. See Gerard Baker & James Kynge, Bombing Raids "May Have Killed bin Laden, " FIN.
TIMES (London), Dec. 24, 2001, at 7 (noting that interim President Hamid Karzai was sworn in
on December 22, 2001); Craig Gordon, Marines Hold Prisoners/FBI to Interview al-Qaida
Fighters, NEWSDAY, Dec. 19, 2001, at A7 (reporting that the United States had constructed a
prison at Kandahar by December 18, 2001); Thomas E. Ricks, War Shifts from Combat Sweeps to
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see the general close of military operations,54 the United States may still
be bound by the Conventions as an occupying power.55 The fact of U.S.
occupation of Iraq is not in dispute. 6
With respect to either occupation, the Bush administration may assert
that the United States is no longer an occupying power,57 and accord-
ingly the Conventions have ceased to apply. This argument hinges on
the language of Article 6 of the Geneva Civilian Convention, which pro-
vides that, "In the case of occupied territory, the application of the pre-
sent Convention shall cease one year after the general close of military
operations.... Hence, by the very language of the Convention, it is
irrelevant whether the occupation has ceased; the critical measure is the
close of military operations. Moreover, even if there were a consensus
that Afghanistan or Iraq has observed a general close of military opera-
tions,59 and that one year has passed since that time, the Bush admini-
stration's view that occupation has ceased ignores the remainder of Arti-
cle 6 of the Geneva Civilian Convention, which provides:
[T]he Occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration of the
occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the functions
of government in such territory, by the provisions of the follow-
ing Articles of the present Convention: I to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47,
49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, 143.
Protected persons whose release, repatriation or re-establishment
may take place after such dates shall meanwhile continue to
benefit by the present Convention.
60
While it is unclear whether or to what extent occupation has in fact
ended, as long as the United States exercises functions of government in
Small Units Probing Shadows, WASH. POST, July 7, 2002, at Al ("[T]he intention now is that
almost all of the 7,000 U.S. soldiers in the country should increasingly play less a purely military
role and more a political one, in effect acting as a reassuring presence to deter challenges to the
Karzai government and to the international peacekeeping force in Kabul."); see also Tim Golden,
U.S. Says It Fears Detainee Abuse in Repatriation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2006 ("The United
States is paying $12 million to refurbish part of an old Soviet-built prison outside Kabul to house
transferred detainees...."); cf supra note 28 (noting that, as of mid-2006, there are 21,000 U.S.
troops in Afghanistan and that the United States expects to maintain those numbers).
54. See supra note 28.
55. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 24.
57. Cf Press Release, Security Counsel, Press Statement by Security Council President on
Handover of Sovereignty to Iraq, U.N. Doc SC/8136 (June 28, 2004) (stating that the handover of
authority on June 28, 2004 ended the occupation of Iraq).
58. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 6.
59. But see supra notes 27 and 28 and accompanying text.
60. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 6.
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Afghanistan or Iraq, the United States is bound by the above-listed Arti-
cles.
The administration may argue that Iraq assumed sovereignty on June
28, 2004,61 but the United States still exercises certain functions of gov-
ernment in Iraq, including the maintenance of security forces 62 and de-
tention facilities, 63 as well as border control. 64 Hence, the United States
61. See The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United
Kingdom in Istanbul, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1170, 1170 (June 28, 2004), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/v40no27.html. But see CIA, WORLD FACTBOOK (2005), avail-
able at https://www.cia.gov/cia/download2005.htm (stating that as of October 20, 2005, the "gov-
ernment type" of Iraq was "none"). For a useful discussion applying property law's "bundle of
sticks" analogy to sovereignty, see Anthony Sammons, The "Under-Theorization" of Universal
Jurisdiction: Implications for Legitimacy on Trials of War Criminals by National Courts, 21
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 111, 115-18 (2003). U.S. involvement in Iraq reveals some of these layers
of sovereignty and control. See Associated Press, Saddam 's Lawyers Want France to Force U.S.
to Permit Access to Client, FRONTRUNNER, July 23, 2004 (noting that in June 2004 U.S. forces
transferred "legal custody" of Saddam Hussein and his top lieutenants to Iraq's interim govern-
ment, thereby allegedly stripping them of their POW status, but that "[tihe men remain detained,
with U.S. forces as their jailers"); see also infra note 131 (demonstrating that a transfer designed
to strip a person of POW status and protections violates Articles 1 and 12 of the POW Conven-
tion).
62. See Accelerating Economic Progress in Iraq: Hearing Before the S. Foreign Rels.
Comm., 109th Cong. (July 20, 2005) (statement of Frederick D. Barton, Senior Advisor, Center
for Strategic and International Studies), available at http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2005/
BartonTestimony050720.pdf ("Right now the U.S. military controls 70% of the $18 billion Iraq
Relief and Reconstruction Fund."); Alan Cowell & David S. Cloud, British Memo Details a Plan
to Cut Troops, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2005, at A7 (reporting that a classified British memo indi-
cated that the U.S. military hoped to hand over control of fourteen of Iraq's eighteen provinces to
Iraqi forces by the end of 2006). As of early 2006, the United States had about 138,000 troops in
Iraq. See Inquiry to Hear Election Complaints, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2006, at A3.
63. See Associated Press, U.S. to Expand Prison System in Iraq, FRONTRUNNER, June 28,
2005 (reporting U.S. military plans to expand its prisons in Iraq to detain up to 16,000 people);
see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, UPDATE TO ANNEX ONE OF THE SECOND PERIODIC REPORT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE (Oct. 21, 2005),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/55712.htm (stating that U.S.-led coalition forces were
detaining approximately 13,000 persons in Iraq as of September 2005); Ellen Knickmeyer, In-
spectors Find More Torture at Iraqi Jails, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2006, at A l (reporting that U.S.
troops in November 2005 transferred Iraqi-held detainees into U.S. military custody after discov-
ering signs of torture); Nancy A. Youssef, Last Days at Abu Ghraib, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Aug. 27, 2006, at A6 (noting that U.S. authorities had removed approximately 3,600 prisoners
from Abu Ghraib and had transferred most of them to two other U.S.-run detention centers in
Iraq). But see Knickmeyer, supra (noting that the Iraqi Justice Minister insisted that U.S. troops
"'don't have the right' to transfer detainees from detention centers operated by Iraqi ministries").
There is some inconsistency regarding who is responsible for detentions in the U.S. military's
three main detention facilities in Iraq. Compare Americans Held for Aiding Insurgents, CHI.
TRIB., July 7, 2005, at 12 ("The U.S. military in Iraq has detained five Americans for suspected
insurgent activity, Pentagon officials said Wednesday."), with Daily Press Briefing, Sean
McCormack, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State (July 7, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/49027.htm ("Mr. Kar is being held by the multinational force in Iraq and the
U.S. Defense officials from the multinational force have been in regular contact with him.").
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maintains a high level of control over Iraq, even after official transfer of
sovereignty. 65 In Afghanistan, the United States still retains control over
certain detention facilities and detainees in Afghanistan, and the United
States controls the transfer of those detainees. 66 Because the Geneva
POW and Civilian Conventions protect detained persons until they are
released or transferred, those persons held in detention are potentially
protected by one of those two Conventions while in U.S. control in Af-
ghanistan.67 Therefore, regardless of the status of occupation, protected
persons who are not yet released or repatriated continue to be protected
until their release or repatriation. 68 In summary, the Geneva Civilian
Convention's provisions regulating occupation are still in force in both
Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly as they relate to detainees in each
country, as well as border control and security operations in Iraq.
64. See CIA, WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 61 ("[C]oalition forces assist Iraqis in monitor-
ing boundary security."); Michael Barone, Getting Specific, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 12,
2005, at 44 (reporting that the Iraqi army has been redirected "from border control to internal po-
licing"); Hernn Rozemberg, U.S. Border Patrol Helping Iraqis Set Boundaries, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, June 23, 2005, at IA ("The [U.S.] border support teams will be dispatched as
long as the [Coalition] military says they're needed.... The military has no plans to call them off
anytime soon, [Lt. Col. Fred] Wellman, [spokesman for the Multi-National Security Transition
Command in Baghdad] said.").
65. See Patrick Cockburn, The True, Terrible State of Iraq and the London Link,
INDEPENDENT, July 20, 2005, at 29 ("The much-resented presence of U.S. troops in Iraq has
helped fuel the insurgency and tainted Iraqi governments as puppets of the US."); Jeffrey Gettle-
man, Iraqis Start to Exercise Power Even Before Date for Turnover, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2004,
at I ("[A] large United States Embassy is being built on the grounds of the occupation authority
in central Baghdad, essentially to serve as a shadow government."); Fox News Sunday, Dec. 25,
2005 (Gen. Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, interview with Chris Wallace,
Washington, D.C.), available at http://www.jcs.mil/chairman/speeches/051225_CJCSFOX-
NEWS-SUNDAY.html (reporting that U.S. forces will be "turning over more and more territory
on the ground" to Iraqi forces and predicting that territories "currently controlled, mostly by coa-
lition forces" will be handed over to Iraqis).
66. See Jimmy Bums & Rachel Morarjee, US Plans Afghan Jail for Terror Suspects, FIN.
TIMES (London), Jan. 5, 2006, at I (reporting that approximately 500 people are held by the U.S.
military at the Bagram and Kandahar bases in Afghanistan, that others are believed to be held in
secret locations elsewhere in the country, and that the United States plans to construct a new high-
security prison in Afghanistan to receive Guantinamo detainees and other terror suspects); Daily
Press Briefing, Scott McClellan (May 23, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2005/05/20050523-9.html (noting that the United States maintains control over
detainees at Bagram, and will only transfer them to the custody of the government of Afghanistan
after certain security measures are in place); see also Council of Europe, Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights, Draft Report: Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-State
Transfers Involving Council of Europe Member States, at 18, para. 65, AS/Jur (2006) 16 Part II
(June 7, 2006) (prepared by Dick Marty), available at http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/
2006/20060606_Ejdoc 162006PartlI-FINAL.pdf (noting that "[t]he axis between Tashkent and
Kabul was well known for detainee transfers").
67. See supra notes 30-60 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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III. WHO IS AFFORDED PROTECTED PERSON STATUS?
People who are detained after being engaged in combat are typically
protected as prisoners of war, while civilians enjoy a separate set of pro-
tections. Part A describes who is entitled to prisoner of war protections,
and Part B explores the contention that some fighters are "unlawful
combatants" and therefore unprotected by the Geneva Conventions. Part
C sets forth the categories of civilians protected by the Geneva Conven-
tions, and Part D addresses the relationship between the Geneva Civil-
ian and POW Conventions that ensures that no individual falls outside
the scope of Geneva's humanitarian law protections.
A. Prisoners of War
Article 4 of the Geneva POW Convention describes the people pro-
tected by that Convention.69 Section A(l) of Article 4 defines POWs as
69. Article 4 reads:
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging
to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members
of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including
those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict
and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occu-
pied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized
resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) That of carrying arms openly;
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.
3. Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or
an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
6. Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had
time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms
openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present
Convention:
1. Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied
country, if the occupying Power considers it necessary by reason of such alle-
giance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated them while hos-
tilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in particular where such
persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which
they belong and which are engaged in combat, or where they fail to comply
with a summons made to them with a view to internment.
Geneva POW Convention, supra note 4, art. 4.
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"[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed
forces" who have fallen into enemy hands. 70 Section A(2) qualifies an-
other category of persons for POW protections:
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to
a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own terri-
tory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias
or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance move-
ments, fulfil
four conditions, including carrying arms openly and wearing a uniform
or other identifiable marker.71 There is some debate as to whether the
four conditions detailed in Section A(2) also apply to individuals in Sec-
tion A(1). 72 A careful reading, however, supports the conclusion that the
four conditions constitute stricter requirements for individuals who are
not members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, rather than
general requirements for all individuals seeking POW status.
73
B. "Unlawful Combatants "?
The principal basis for the Bush administration's attempt to deny the
applicability of the Geneva Conventions is the claim that certain indi-
viduals in U.S. custody are ineligible for the protections offered under
the Geneva Conventions. 74 The Yoo and Delahunty memorandum men-
tioned above argues that al Qaeda members do not comply with the four
requirements listed in Article 4(A)(2) of the Geneva POW Convention,
and therefore are not entitled to POW status.75 The Bush memorandum
70. Geneva POW Convention, supra note 4, art. 4(a)(1).
71. The conditions are: "(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subor-
dinates; (b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) That of carrying
arms openly; (d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
war." Geneva POW Convention, supra note 4, art. 4(2).
72. Compare Kretzmer, supra note 13, at 191 (arguing that the conditions do not apply to the
armed forces of a High Contracting Party) with Adam Roberts, Role of Law in the "War on Ter-
ror": A Tragic Clash, 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 18, 22 (2003) (contending that all combat-
ants must satisfy the four criteria in order to receive POW protections).
73. Pictet's Commentary on the Geneva Civilian Convention confirms this conclusion:
"There are certain cases about which some hesitation may be felt. We may mention, first, the case
of partisans, to which Article 4, A (2), of the Third Convention refers. Members of resistance
movements must fulfill certain stated conditions before they can be regarded as prisoners of war."
Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 50.
74. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795 (2006).
75. Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 15, at 49-50.
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determined that the Taliban were excluded from protection under the
Geneva POW Convention because they were "unlawful combatants. 76
The Bush memorandum also argues that the Geneva POW Convention
"assumes the existence of 'regular' armed forces fighting on behalf of
States.",77 In fact, the Convention makes no mention of "unlawful com-
batants," "unlawful belligerents," or "enemy combatants,, 78 and by its
terms does not envision a category of fighters in an international armed
conflict that would be excluded from all Geneva protections. Addition-
ally, the Convention only uses the term "regular armed forces" to de-
scribe a third category of POWs in Article 4(A)(3). 79 Article 4(A)(2) ac-
tually presumes the existence of "organized resistance movements,
belonging to a Party to the conflict." 80 It is nonsensical to imagine that
organized resistance movements are only protected POWs if they are
members of the regular armed forces of a High Contracting Party. In-
deed, Pictet's reference to "partisans" in his Commentary on Article
4(A)(2) 81 indicates that these are not "regular" armed forces fighting on
behalf of states. Moreover, the underlying purpose for the four Article
4(A)(2) requirements is to enable participants in an armed conflict to
know whom they may target for armed violence. 2 To the extent that
United States forces knew whom to target in Afghanistan, for example,
the principles embodied in Article 4(A)(2) were met, and hence those
individuals should be afforded POW protections.
Additionally, several observations support the conclusion that the
word "belonging" in Article 4(A)(2) logically refers to nationality and
76. See Bush, supra note 20 at 134-35 ("I determine that the provisions of Geneva will apply
to our present conflict with the Taliban.... I determine that the Taliban detainees are unlawful
combatants and, therefore, do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva.").
77. Id. at 134.
78. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice O'Connor borrowed from a government brief to define, for
the purposes of the case, the term "enemy combatant," but noted that the administration had failed
to provide the Court with the criteria it uses to determine whether an individual qualifies as such.
See 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004); see also Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761 n.l (citing a military order
defining "enemy combatant" as an individual belonging to or supporting the Taliban or al Qaeda
forces or other forces engaged in hostilities against the United States or its allies); cf Harold
Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1479, 1509 (2003) (noting that the
Bush Administration's insistence on the "enemy combatant" label is "driving a wedge" between
the United States and its allies).
79. Geneva POW Convention, supra note 4, art. 4(A)(3) (stating that Prisoners of War in-
clude "[m]embers of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority
not recognized by the Detaining Power").
80. Id. art. 4.
81. See supra note 73.
82. Eric Talbot Jensen, Combatant Status: It Is Time for Intermediate Levels of Recognition
for Partial Compliance, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 209, 224-25 (2005).
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not armed forces affiliation. First, Article 4(A)(1) makes reference to
"members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict," as contrasted
with "members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party
to the conflict.... ,83 The text therefore suggests that those persons in-
cluded in (A)(2) are not members of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict. Second, the language of Article 4 indicates a difference be-
tween "belonging to a Party to the conflict," and belonging to the armed
forces of a Party to the conflict. Article 4(B)(1) makes reference to "per-
sons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied
country." 84 Article 4 envisions groups of individuals who are not mem-
bers of the armed forces and who are not operating under the direction
of a High Contracting Party, but who still may be afforded the protec-
tions of POW status. President Bush's interpretation of Article 4 ignores
this category of fighters protected as POWs under Article 4(A)(2).
Hence, the President's conclusion that, "the war against terrorism ushers
in a new paradigm" not imagined by the Geneva Conventions 85 is inac-
curate; the Geneva POW Convention makes provisions for combatants
who are not part of the regular armed forces of a High Contracting
Party, affording them POW status if they identify themselves in accor-
dance with Article 4(A)(2).86
During the armed conflict between the United States and Iraq, the
United States held hearings to determine whether individuals qualified
as POWs under Article 4, as required by Article 5.87 These "Article 5
Hearings" are required under the Geneva POW Convention, "[s]hould
any doubt arise" as to whether a person belongs to any of the categories
of fighters in Article 4.88 Unlike the conflict in Afghanistan, during
which the President issued a blanket determination that no Taliban or al
Qaeda fighters were protected persons under the Geneva POW Conven-
tion,89 determinations of POW status in Iraq have been made on an indi-
83. Geneva POW Convention, supra note 4, art. 4(A).
84. Id. art. 4(B)(1).
85. Bush, supra note 20, at 134.
86. See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795 n.61 (2006) (reserving the question
of whether Hamdan's potential status as a prisoner of war entitles him to an Article 5 hearing).
87. See Peter Barker, U.S. Forces Rounding Up Civilian Suspects, Some Detainees May Be
Sent to Cuba, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2003, at Al; Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Detention Policies Faced
Continued Criticism and Legal Challenges, 21 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 11 (2005); see also
Geneva POW Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(2).
88. Geneva POW Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(2).
89. Some have asserted that the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) at Guantdnamo
fulfill the requirements of Article 5 status determination tribunals. See Detainees: Hearing Before
the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. (June 15, 2005) ("The CSRT process.. outlines provisions
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vidual basis, and when a person's status is in doubt, the person is af-
forded a hearing to determine whether POW protection is warranted. Yet
even if certain Taliban or al Qaeda fighters are not protected as POWs,
the following sections demonstrate that they would likely be protected
persons under the Geneva Civilian Convention.
C. Civilians
Article 4 of the Geneva Civilian Convention describes the people
protected under the scope of the Convention:
Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given
moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case
of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict
or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.
Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are
not protected by it. Nationals of a neutral State who find them-
selves in the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-
belligerent State, shall not be regarded as protected persons while
the State of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic rep-
resentation in the State in whose hands they are.
90
Pictet's Commentary acknowledges that the meaning of "protected per-
sons" in Article 4 "does not stand out very clearly....",
91
Article 4 does not afford protection at any time to persons in the
hands of a Party to the conflict of which they are nationals, such as John
Walker Lindh, a U.S. citizen captured by U.S. forces on the battlefield
in Afghanistan.92 Nor does it protect nationals of a country not bound by
for tribunals that exceed the requirements of tribunals that implement Article 5 of the 1949 Ge-
neva Convention....") (statement of Rear Admiral James McGarrah, Director of the Office for the
Administrative Review for the Detention of Enemy Combatants). Yet the purpose of those tribu-
nals is not to evaluate whether an individual qualifies as a POW under Article 4, but rather to de-
termine whether an individual is an "enemy combatant" under a definition created by the Bush
administration. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 480 (D.D.C. 2005)
("[N]owhere do the CSRT records for many of those petitioners reveal specific findings that they
committed some particular act or failed to satisfy some defined prerequisite entitling the respon-
dents to deprive them of prisoner of war status."); Gordon England, Combatant Status Review
Tribunals, Special Defense Department Briefing with Secretary of the Navy Gordon England
(Aug. 13, 2004) available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20O40813-1149.html
(stating that the sole purpose of CSRTs is to determine detainees' status as "enemy combatants").
90. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 4.
91. Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 45.
92. See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 545 (E.D. Va. 2002) (stating that Lindh
is a U.S. citizen fighting for al Qaeda). Because Lindh was a combatant, the court held that he did
not have lawful combatant immunity due to his status as a member of the Taliban, an organization
which did not satisfy the four criteria in Article 4(A)(2) of the POW Convention. As argued be-
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the Convention, such as Ali Ahmed Moussa, a civilian from Somalia,
which is not a High Contracting Party to the Geneva Civilian Conven-
tion.93 Nationals of a co-belligerent state, such as Feroz Abbasi, a citizen
of the United Kingdom seized by U.S. forces on the battlefield in Af-
ghanistan,94 are also not protected.95 For all others, however, the analy-
sis is more complex.
During the conflict in Afghanistan, nationals of neutral States who
were found in Afghanistan found themselves unprotected under the Ge-
neva Conventions, provided that their home countries maintained nor-
mal diplomatic relations with the United States.96 As noted above, the
Bush administration reached this conclusion without drawing on the
language of Article 4, by arguing that these individuals are members of
al Qaeda and therefore the Geneva Conventions do not apply to them at
all, regardless of the diplomatic relations between the United States and
their home countries. A more appropriate interpretation of the Conven-
tions is that they are applicable depending on the nature of the particular
conflict, rather than on the status of the particular factions who are
fighting.97 Therefore, Afghanis captured by U.S. forces during the con-
low, persons ineligible for protection as POWs should be considered for protection under the Ci-
vilian Convention.
93. Somalia is a High Contracting party to all of the 1949 Geneva Conventions except for the
Civilian Geneva Convention. See University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, Ratification of
International Human Rights Treaties, 2004, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
research/ratification-index.html. Moussa was a truck driver for a Kuwaiti company in Iraq. He
was captured by the forces of Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq in 2004. See Tom Lasseter, U.S.
Troops, Radicals Clash in Najaf Knight Ridder News Service, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 3, 2004, at
14A.
94. See Carol D. Leonnig & Glenn Frankel, US. to Send 5 Detainees Home From Guan-
tanamo; Australian, Four Britons Allege Abuse, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2005, at Al.
95. Even though these individuals are not protected under the Geneva Conventions, they may
have redress in U.S. courts under the "law of nations." See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(4) (2006);
WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 188-89 (1980) (discuss-
ing the history of this obscure provision of the habeas statute).
96. The rationale behind carving this exception out of the Geneva POW Convention is that
diplomatic relations can serve to protect the interests of those individuals: "In the territory of the
belligerent States the position of neutrals is still governed by any treaties concerning the legal
status of aliens and their diplomatic representatives can take steps to protect them." Pictet, Civil-
ian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 49. This approach indicates that other agreements govern
the treatment of such individuals, including Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Re-
lations, which requires detaining authorities to grant consular officers access to detainees who are
nationals of their state. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21
U.S.T. 77, 100, 596 U.N.T.S. 292, 292 [hereinafter Vienna Consular Convention]. For discussion
of the ramifications of extraordinary rendition under the terms of the Vienna Consular Conven-
tion, see Weissbrodt & Bergquist, supra note 3, at 145-47.
97. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 161 (D.D.C. 2004) ("[T]he govern-
ment's attempt to separate the Taliban from al Qaeda for Geneva Convention purposes finds no
support in the structure of the Conventions themselves, which are triggered by the place of the
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flict in Afghanistan qualify as protected persons under the Geneva Civil-
ian Convention," but non-Afghanis may not.
99
The preceding analysis, however, is only relevant during armed con-
flict. Initially, this observation may appear to highlight a distinction
without a difference, but it is highly relevant to the protected person
status of nationals of neutral states who find themselves in occupied ter-
ritory. The reason is as follows: nationals of neutral states "who find
themselves in the territory of a belligerent State" are not protected per-
sons as defined in Article 4,100 but because an occupied territory is no
longer "the territory of a belligerent State," nationals of neutral states
automatically gain the status of protected persons when occupation be-
gins. Therefore, because the United States is no longer engaged in hos-
tilities against Iraq or Afghanistan, nationals of neutral states in those
countries are no longer in the territory of a belligerent State, even
though fighting in those states continues. Pictet explains the distinction:
[I]n occupied territory [nationals of neutral States] are protected
persons and the Convention is applicable to them; its application
in this case does not depend on the existence or non-existence of
normal diplomatic representation....
On the other hand, nationals of a neutral State in the territory of a
conflict, and not by what particular faction a fighter is associated with."); Memorandum from
William H. Taft, IV to Counsel to the President, Comments on Your Paper on the Geneva Con-
vention (Feb. 2, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS supra note 15, at 129 ("The structure of the pa-
per suggesting a distinction between our conflict with al Qaeda and our conflict with the Taliban
does not conform to the structure of the Conventions. The Conventions call for a decision
whether they apply to the conflict in Afghanistan. If they do, their provisions are applicable to all
persons involved in that conflict-al Qaeda, Taliban, Northern Alliance, U.S. troops, civilians,
etc."); see also Lt. Col. Paul E. Kantwill & Maj. Sean Watts, Hostile Protected Persons or "'Ex-
tra-Conventional Persons ": How Unla-,uid Combatants in the War on Terrorism Posed Extraor-
dinary Challenges for Military Attorneys and Commanders, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 681, 738
(2005).
98. Contra Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terror-
ism, Mar. 6, 2003, in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 15, at 241 (noting that the Justice De-
partment has concluded that the Geneva Convention for the protection of Civilians does not apply
to "unlawful combatants").
99. Even if an individual is not a protected person as defined by Article 4, certain provisions
of the Geneva Civilian Convention are broader in scope. See Geneva Civilian Convention, supra
note 4, art. 4 ("The provisions of Part I are, however, wider in application, as defined in Article
13."). These provisions "cover the whole of the populations of the countries in conflict, without
any adverse distinction based, in particular, on.. nationality...." Id. art. 13. Part II consists of Ar-
ticles 13-26, which are not relevant to a discussion of extraordinary rendition. If there is or was a
period of time during which the United States could be construed as an "occupying power" of
Afghanistan under the Geneva Civilian Convention, non-Afghanis would have protected person
status. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
100. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 4.
[Vol. 47:2
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
Party to the conflict are only protected persons if their State has
no normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands
they are.' 0 1
Accordingly, under this interpretation, nationals of neutral states dur-
ing occupation are persons protected by the Geneva Civilian Conven-
tion, and even if occupation may have ended and one year has passed
since the general close of military operations, they are still protected as
regards the protections afforded by Article 6.102 Additionally, any per-
sons not nationals of the United States or coalition countries who came
into U.S. custody prior to the end of occupation maintain their status as
protected persons until their release. 1
03
D. Mind the Gap
The Bush administration memoranda mistakenly did not address the
possibility that a person not protected under the Geneva POW Conven-
tion would be protected as a civilian by the terms of the Geneva Civilian
Convention.104 Pictet explained the interrelationship between protected
person status in each of the Conventions, noting that "[t]hey must be
treated as prescribed in the texts which concern them. But if, for some
reason, prisoner of war status-to take one example-were denied to
them, they would become protected persons under the [Civilian] Con-
vention." 10 5 He expressly stated that partisans failing to fulfill the four
criteria in Article 4 Section (A)(2) of the Geneva POW Convention
"must be considered to be protected persons within the meaning of the
[Civilian] Convention."'1 6 Pictet concludes his discussion of the classes
of individuals protected under the four Geneva Conventions:
In short, all the particular cases we have just been considering
confirm a general principle which is embodied in all four Geneva
101. Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 48.
102. See supra text accompanying note 60. These protections include the prohibition on
forcible transfer in Article 49. There are approximately 420 people in U.S. detention facilities in
Iraq who are neither U.S. citizens nor Iraqis. See Josh White, 5 Americans Held by U.S. Forces in
Iraq Fighting, WASH. POST, July 7, 2005, at A15.
103. See Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 4; supra text accompanying
notes 30-32.
104. Evidently the administration addressed this issue at some point. See Working Group Re-
port on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism, supra note 98, at 241 ("The De-
partment of Justice has opined that the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Personnel in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) does not apply to unlawful combatants.").
To date any written record of the discussion appears to remain classified.
105. Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 50.
106. Id.
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Conventions of 1949. Every person in enemy hands must have
some status under international law: he is either a prisoner of war
and, as such, covered by the [Geneva POW] Convention, a civil-
ian covered by the [Geneva Civilian] Convention, or again, a
member of the medical personnel of the armed forces who is
covered by the First Convention. There is no intermediate status;
nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law. 
07
This conclusion is confirmed by two other provisions in the Geneva
Civilian Convention. First, the language of the fourth paragraph of Arti-
cle 4 of the Geneva Civilian Convention states that persons protected by
one of the other three Conventions are not "considered as protected per-
sons within the meaning of the present convention."10 8 Consequently,
the purpose of the Geneva Civilian Convention is to protect persons not
otherwise protected by the other Conventions. Second, strong evidence
demonstrates that the parties at the diplomatic conference considered
whether individuals not complying with the laws of war should be pro-
tected persons: "Some people considered that the Convention should
apply without exception to all the persons to whom it referred, while to
others it seemed obvious that persons guilty of violating the laws of war
were not entitled to claim its benefits."10 9 As a product of discussion of
these diverging views, the diplomatic conference drafted Article 5.10
Article 5 of the Geneva Civilian Convention allows for additional limi-
tations on the rights of protected persons who are spies or saboteurs, or
otherwise "definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the
security of the State.""' Implicit in this provision is the agreement
among participants in the diplomatic conference that among those pro-
tected persons under the Geneva Civilian Convention are persons not
complying with the laws of warfare:
107. Id. at 51. Pictet's language is slightly over-stated; the Geneva Conventions do not gener-
ally afford protection to nationals of co-belligerents, nor do they protect civilians of neutral coun-
tries, except in times of occupation. See supra text accompanying notes 93-104. Article 75 of the
1977 Protocol I, however, fills this gap and is generally accepted as customary international law.
See supra note 6.
108. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 4, para. 4.
109. Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 52.
110. Seeid. at 52-54.
111. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 5, paras. 1-2. In occupied territory, per-
sons detained as spies or saboteurs are not afforded rights of communication under certain cir-
cumstances. See id. art. 5, para. 2. During armed conflict, persons "definitely suspected of or en-
gaged in activities hostile to the security of the state" are not entitled "to claim such rights and
privileges under the [Fourth] Convention as would, if exercised in the favour of such individual
person, be prejudicial to the security of such State." Id. art. 5, para. 1.
[Vol. 47:2
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
It may... seem rather surprising that a humanitarian Convention
should tend to protect spies, saboteurs or irregular combatants.
Those who take part in the struggle while not belonging to the
armed forces are acting deliberately outside the laws of war-
fare.... It might therefore have been simpler to exclude them
from the benefits of the Convention,.... but the terms espionage,
sabotage, terrorism, banditry, and intelligence with the enemy,
have so often been used lightly, and applied to such trivial of-
fences, that it was not advisable to leave the accused at the mercy
of those detaining them.' 12
This passage from Pictet's Commentary indicates that the parties at
the diplomatic conference were well aware of the danger of allowing a
High Contracting Party to categorize a person as an "irregular combat-
ant" or "terrorist" and thus attempt to dispense with any of the provi-
sions of the Conventions. Article 5 was intended to take into account the
security interests of the detaining state while guarding against abuses
that could result if the simple label of "irregular combatant" would al-
low a High Contracting Party to place a person outside the scope of the
Conventions.1 3 The U.S. Army Field Manual confirms that Article 5 is
evidence that all hostile individuals who are not protected as POWs are
protected under the Geneva Civilian Convention. 114 This conclusion has
also been confirmed by the European Commission for Democracy
Through Law." 1 5
Therefore, based on the above analysis, during armed conflict be-
tween High Contracting Parties, the Fourth Convention is clearly in-
112. Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 53.
113. See id.; Geoffrey Corn, Principle 5: Protecting the Force from Unlawful Belligerents,
ARMY LAW., Feb. 1999, at 26, 28.
114. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE para. 247(b) (1956) ("Subject to qualifications set forth in paragraph 248, those pro-
tected by [the Geneva Conventions] also include all persons who have engaged in hostile or bel-
ligerent conduct but who are not entitled to treatment as prisoners of war."); id. para. 248(b)
("[A]n individual protected person [who] is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile
to the security of the State,... is... not entitled to claim such rights and privileges under [the Ge-
neva Conventions] as would, if exercised in favor of such individual person, be prejudicial to the
security of such State."); Kantwill & Watts, supra note 97, at 730-31. But see Julian E. Barnes,
Army to Use Geneva Rules for Detainees: New Manual Eliminates Secret Tactics and Separate
Standards for Questioning Captives, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006 (reporting that the new U.S. Army
Field Manual interrogation provisions "will not apply to CIA interrogators working in prisons run
by other countries").
115. Council of Europe, European Commission For Democracy Through Law, Opinion on
the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret De-
tention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, (Mar. 17, 2006) at 20, paras. 82-83,
available at http://www.apt.ch/secret-detention/venice.commission.pdf.
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tended to encompass anyone who is not a national of a neutral or co-
belligerent State who is not protected under one of the other Conven-
tions. During occupation, protection is also extended to nationals of
neutral States.
As demonstrated above, in situations where al Qaeda is fighting in a
conflict between two or more High Contracting Parties (e.g., the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq), it seems reasonable to conclude that the Geneva
Conventions would still apply to the armed conflict as a whole." 6 None-
theless, members of al Qaeda would likely fail to qualify as prisoners of
war under Article 4.117 They would, however, still retain protections as
civilians under terms of the Geneva Civilian Convention.
IV. WHAT RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS ARE AFFORDED TO THOSE
PROTECTED PERSONS?
A. Protection Against Torture and Inhuman Treatment
Both civilians and POWs are protected against "willful killing, tor-
ture or inhuman treatment"" 8 because both the Geneva Civilian and
POW Conventions protect against such grave breaches.11 9 In addition,
the Supreme Court recently found that Common Article 3 applies to in-
dividuals not "associated with" High Contracting Parties, 20 and there-
fore presumably Article 3's prohibition "at any time and in any place
whatsoever" against "violence to life and person, in particular murder of
all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture" as well as "outrages
upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treat-
ment" applies to all individuals detained as part of the "war on ter-
ror."' 12 1 Moreover, Common Article 1 calls on "[t]he High Contracting
Parties [to] undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present
116. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. But see Bush, supra note 20, at 134-35 (dis-
tinguishing between the conflict with al Qaeda and the conflict with the Taliban in Afghanistan,
and stating that the conventions only apply to the conflict with the Taliban).
117. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
118. Compare Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 147, with Geneva POW Con-
vention, supra note 4, art. 131.
119. Compare Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 147, with Geneva POW Con-
vention, supra note 4, art. 130.
120. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2796 (2006).
121. See, e.g., Geneva POW Convention, supra note 4, art. 3(l)(a), (c); see also Posting of
Marty Lederman to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2006/06/
hamdan_summary.html (June 29, 2006, 10:37 EST) (concluding that the Hamdan Common Arti-




Convention in all circumstances."1 22 This article is of particular rele-
vance to the U.S. practice of extraordinary rendition, for not only must
the United States itself respect the prohibition against torture and inhu-
man treatment, it must also ensure respect for the prohibition in all cir-
cumstances. These rights and protections are afforded to POWs and to
protected civilians, regardless of whether those individuals are detained
during armed conflict or during occupation, and regardless of whether
they are "associated with" a High Contracting Party.
B. Special Protections Prohibiting Transfer of Civilians
With regard to occupation, the Geneva Civilian Convention also in-
cludes as a grave breach "unlawful deportation or transfer...of a pro-
tected person.... ,,I23 As the Commentary explains, "unlawful deporta-
tion or transfer" includes breaches of Article 49.124 Article 49 governs
deportations, transfers, and evacuations:
Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of
protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the
Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or
not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.
Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or par-
tial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or
imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacuations may
not involve the displacement of protected persons outside the
bounds of the occupied territory except when for material rea-
sons it is impossible to avoid such displacement. Persons thus
evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as
hostilities in the area in question have ceased.
122. E.g., Geneva POW Convention, supra note 4, art. 1.
123. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 147 ("Grave breaches.. shall be those in-
volving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the pre-
sent Convention: ... unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected per-
son....").
124. Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 599. Some commentators have argued
that the word "unlawful" in Article 147 suggests that some deportations may be lawful and there-
fore would not constitute grave breaches. See, e.g., Emannuel Gross, Defensive Democracy: Is It
Possible to Revoke the Citizenship, Deport, or Negate the Civil Rights of a Person Instigating
Terrorist Action Against His Own State?, 72 UMKC L. REV. 51, 85 (2003). This conclusion is
contradicted both by the absolute prohibition on deportation in Article 49, and the commentary
for Article 147, which states, "The unhappy experiences of the Second World War have made it
necessary to prohibit deportation completely in this Convention." Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY,
supra note 11, at 599.
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The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its
own civilian population into the territory it occupies.
25
Because Article 49 may be implicated in cases of extraordinary rendi-
tion, it is of particular relevance to the present analysis. Article 49 is one
of the articles listed as still binding on an occupying power more than
one year after the end military operations, so long as, and to the extent
that, the occupying power still exercises the functions of government.
Therefore, to the extent that the United States ever was an occupying
power, and to the extent that it still exercises any functions of govern-
ment in that previously or currently occupied territory,126 it is bound by
Article 49. If, in that capacity, it detains individuals initially seized dur-
ing occupation, it must treat them in accordance with Article 49. U.S.
officials responsible for transfers under those conditions are thereby
committing grave breaches of the Geneva Civilian Convention.
The Bush administration asserted that no Taliban or al Qaeda fighters
in Afghanistan were protected persons under the Geneva POW Conven-
tion.127 Therefore, all such fighters who were not coalition nationals
were protected persons under the Geneva Civilian Convention 28 during
the occupation period and for one year after the general close of military
operations. 29 Accordingly, their forcible transfer outside of Afghani-
stan, whether for purposes of extraordinary rendition or simply to move
them to the detention facility at Guantdinamo, constitutes a grave breach
of the Geneva Civilian Convention.
In Iraq, any extraterritorial transfer of a person not a POW and not a
national of the United States or of another member nation of the coali-
tion forces is also a grave breach. The CIA reportedly transferred a
number of detainees out of occupied Iraq. 130 Those transfers could only
avoid constituting grave breaches if the detainees were POWs131 or were
125. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 49, paras. 1, 2, 6.
126. See supri notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
127. See Bush, supra note 20, at 135 ("1 determine that the Taliban detainees are unlawful
combatants and, therefore, do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva.").
128. See supra notes 75-87, 105-18 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 2 ("One intelligence official familiar with the operation said
the CIA has used the [Goldsmith Memorandum] as legal support for secretly transporting as
many as a dozen detainees out of Iraq in the last six months.").
131. Article 12 allows High Contracting Parties to transfer POWs, but only "to a Power
which is a party to the Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the will-
ingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the Convention." Geneva POW Convention,
supra note 4, art. 12, para. 2. It is important to view this article in the context of both Article I,
requiring High Contracting Parties to respect and ensure respect for the POW Convention in all
circumstances, and Article 131, which warns that, "No High Contracting Party shall be allowed to
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nationals of the United States or other countries participating in coali-
tion forces.132 Therefore, in all likelihood nearly every forcible transfer
of a detainee out of Iraq during occupation is a grave breach.
Despite this clear analysis, the Bush administration has maintained
that several gaps exist in the scope of protections afforded to persons
protected under the Geneva Civilian Convention.133 According to a
memorandum prepared in March 2004 by Jack Goldsmith, who was
then Assistant Attorney General at the Office of Legal Counsel, 134 there
are two gaps in the Geneva Civilian Convention as it pertains to Article
49 . 35 First, he argues that Article 49 does not prohibit removal of indi-
viduals who are not lawfully present in occupied territory.' 36 Second, he
contends that Article 49 does not prohibit temporary transfers from oc-
cupied territory for purposes of interrogation.' 
37
1. Goldsmith Gap One
138
The first purported gap relates to the status of nationals of neutral
states who may be unlawfully present in the occupied territory. Gold-
smith first defines the terms deportation and transfer to suggest that they
absolve itself or any other High Contracting Party of any liability incurred... in respect of [grave]
breaches..." Id. arts. 1, 131. Pictet's Commentary makes it clear that transfer may not be used to
avoid responsibility for adherence to the conventions: "The safeguard contained in [Article 12] is
reinforced by Article 13 1 relating to the responsibilities of the Contracting Parties, which may not
absolve themselves of any liability incurred in respect of one of the grave breaches defined in Ar-
ticle 130." Pictet, POW COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 130.
132. See supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
133. See Draft Memorandum from Jack Goldsmith to Alberto Gonzales, Permissibility of Re-
locating Certain 'Protected Persons' from Occupied Iraq (Mar. 19, 2004) in THE TORTURE
PAPERS 366, supra note 15 at 366.
134. Goldsmith has resigned his position with the government and is now a professor at Har-
vard Law School. See Marcella Bombardieri, Harvard Hire's Detainee Memo Stirs Debate,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 9, 2004, at Al; Michael Isikoff et al., Torture's Path, NEWSWEEK, Dec.
27, 2004, at 54 (noting that Goldsmith resigned "at least partly due to his discomfort about the
[August 1, 2002] memo [authored by John Yoo]").
135. See Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 380. The memorandum presumes that the Geneva Ci-
vilian Convention applies due to occupation, rather than ongoing armed conflict. See id. at 366
("Attached is a draft of an opinion...concerning the meaning of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention as it applies in occupied Iraq.") (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 368-71.
137. Id. at 374-79.
138. The authors' starting point for analysis of the Goldsmith Memorandum was Professor
David Luban's initial reactions to the Goldsmith memorandum, which have been supplemented,
expanded, and elaborated upon in the following two sections. David Luban, The Goldsmith
Memorandum (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). Professor Luban has since
incorporated and elaborated upon the memorandum in The Torture Lawyers of Washington, in
DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (forthcoming July 2007). The authors
would like to thank Professor Luban for sharing his memorandum.
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do not apply to removals of individuals not legally present in a country.
Second, he advances policy arguments in favor of allowing deporta-
tions. Third, he argues that an occupying power has an obligation to en-
force local laws, including local immigration laws. This section exam-
ines each of Goldsmith's arguments in turn, and then identifies recent
changes in Iraqi immigration laws in light of the historical lessons of
World War II as the impetus for Article 49.
a. Goldsmith's Unconventional and Ahistorical Definitions
The Article 49 prohibition on forcible transfers and deportations ap-
plies "regardless of [the] motive, ' 39 and is viewed as absolute. 40 In
spite of the apparent clarity of the language and terms of Article 49,
Goldsmith finds an unwritten exception. He argues that the term "depor-
tation" in Article 49 is a term of art which applies exclusively to people
with a lawful right to be in the occupied country in the first place. 4' He
concludes that people present in Iraq in violation of domestic Iraqi im-
migration laws are not protected under Article 49.
Goldsmith's conclusion is contradicted by the text of Article 49, as
clarified by another article relating to transfers, Article 45. Article 45
provides that "[p]rotected persons shall not be transferred to a Power
which is not a party to the Convention."'' 42 Article 45 does allow for ex-
tradition, "in pursuance of extradition treaties concluded before the out-
break of hostilities, of protected persons accused of offences against or-
dinary criminal law."' 14 3 But Article 45 makes no reference to
deportation. In fact, Pictet notes that within Article 45 "there is no pro-
vision concerning deportation (in French expulsion), the measure taken
by a State to remove an undesirable foreigner from its territory."' 144 Pic-
tet's definition of deportation in his commentary to Article 45 indicates
that the term deportation as used by the parties drafting the Geneva
Conventions is similar to the ordinary understanding of the term, and
quite different from Goldsmith's "term of art" definition. 1
45
139. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 49.
140. See Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 279. But see Gross, supra note 124,
at 83-84 (concluding that the prohibition against deportation is not absolute but rather is limited
by the need to maintain public order and safety).
141. Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 368-71. .,
142. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 45.
143. Id.
144. Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 266.
145. Goldsmith himself concedes that Pictet's Commentary is "authoritative." See Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN
BAG 2d 249. 258 (2002).
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Goldsmith then argues that the prohibition on "individual or mass
forcible transfers" also only applies to people who are lawfully present
in the country. 146 He asserts that, "[p]assages from the ICRC Commen-
tary and the negotiated record illustrate that the words 'transfers' and
'deportations' were used loosely and, at times, interchangeably.... 147
This contention neglects both the rule of construction that each treaty
provision should be given meaning, 148 and Pictet's Commentary on Ar-
ticle 45, which quite clearly distinguishes between the words "transfer"
and "deportation":
Any movement of protected persons to another State.. .is consid-
ered as a transfer for the purposes of Article 45. The term "trans-
fer", for example, may mean internment in the territory of an-
other Power, repatriation, the returning of protected persons to
their country of residence or their extradition. The Convention
makes provision for all these possibilities. On the other hand,
there is no provision concerning deportation (in French expul-
sion), the measure taken by a State to remove an undesirable for-
eigner from its territory.
149
This discussion of the two terms hardly seems to indicate that they are
interchangeable or that the words are used at all "loosely."
A brief examination of history reflects both the danger of Gold-
smith's definitional argument and the rationale behind the absolute pro-
hibition on deportations in Article 49. In 1935, all German Jews were
stripped of their "citizenship,"'' 50 and in 1941 those German Jews living
outside of Germany were deprived of their German "nationality."'
' 51
146. Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 371-74.
147. Id. at 371.
148. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 379 n.13.
149. Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 266.
150. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Competing Frameworks for Assessing Contemporary Holo-
caust-Era Claims, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 107, 129 n.84 (2001) (referencing the 1935 Reich citi-
zenship law). This decree did not affect all Jews living in Germany, however. See HANNAH
ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 143 (1963) ("The second problem was the presence in Ger-
many of a few thousand foreign Jews, whom Germany could not deprive of their nationality
through deportation."). Because the 1935 decree rendered stateless German Jews living in other
countries, it later facilitated deportations throughout Europe, where stateless Jews were the first to
be targeted for deportation. See id. at 150 ("As in practically all other countries, the deportations
from Holland started with stateless Jews, who in this instance consisted almost entirely of refu-
gees from Germany...."). One exception was in Denmark, where the Danes not only refused to
strip Danish Jews of their nationality, but also "explained to the German officials that because the
stateless refugees were no longer German citizens, the Nazis could not claim them without Dan-
ish assent." Id. at 155.
151. Curran, supra note 150, at 129 n.85 (citing the November 25, 1941 decree called the
"efite Verordnung zum reichsbiirgergesetz"); see also Detlev F. Vagts, International Law in the
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This "denationalization" facilitated the purportedly lawful deportation
of many Jews from occupied Europe. As a first step in this deportation
program, Adolf Eichmann was charged with effecting the "forced emi-
gration" of Jews from Austria in 1938,152 which resulted in 45,000 Jews
leaving the country in eight months.' 53 Eichmann was then moved to
Prague, where he instituted a similar program of forced deportations.
54
Once the war began and real (albeit forced) emigration was not possi-
ble, 1 55 deportation became a means both to move Jews to extermination
camps and to supply slave workers to German industries.156 Germany,
under Eichmann's direction, 57 therefore enlisted the cooperation of lo-
cal authorities to strip Jews of their nationality, 58 so as to transform
them into, as Goldsmith would later call the terror suspects, "illegal
aliens." In 1942, the puppet government of Croatia complied with Ger-
man requests to pass anti-Jewish legislation to bring about the deporta-
tion of Jews in that country. 59 In the spring of 1943, Hitler's forces
pressed for changes in occupied France's local immigration and natu-
ralization laws, thereby transforming Jews who had been lawful citizens
of occupied France 60 into deportable aliens. 16 Similar steps were taken
Third Reich, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 661, 694 (1990) (noting that foreign lawyers at the time debated
whether these citizenship rules violated international law).
152. See ARENDT, supra note 150, at 38.
153. See id. at 39.
154. See id. at 60-61.
155. See id. at 63, 68-69.
156. Id. at 73-74, 141.
157. See id. at 171 (noting that Eichmann's office coordinated evacuations and deportations).
158. See id. at 143-44 ("According to the directives of the Wannsee Conference... the Final
Solution was to be applied to all European Jews,... and such things as nationality or the rights of
allied or neutral countries with respect to their citizens were not mentioned. But since Ger-
many... depended upon local good will and cooperation everywhere, these little formalities could
not be sneezed at.").
159. See id. at 165. The legislation included, however, an exception transforming into "hon-
orary Aryans" those Jews who had made contributions to "the Croat cause." Id. This measure
served to block the deportation of about 1,500 Jews from the area. See id. at 165-66.
160. In the 1930s, France had been a haven for thousands of Jewish refugees. See MICHAEL
R. MARRUS & ROBERT 0. PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE AND THE JEWS at xi (1995 Stanford Univ.
Press) (1981).
161. See id. at 324-28 (describing German plans to "denationalize" all Jews who had been
naturalized as citizens of France since 1927 and French resistance to the move that would allow
for the deportation of people who were French citizens). Frustrated with this resistance, the Ger-
man occupation authorities ultimately determined that French citizenship was no bar to deporta-
tion. See id. at 329. Nonetheless, German plans to deport French Jews from Vichy France were
stifled. See ARENDT, supra note 150, at 147. Thousands of French Jews in the northern occupied
zone had already been deported by the Germans. See id. at 135. German occupiers in Slovakia
encountered similar resistance and ultimately dispensed with the policy of deference to local law-
makers. See id. at 186-87.
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in occupied Greece, 162 Holland, 163 and Hungary, 164 among other places.
As Hannah Arendt observed, the Nazis took "extreme care" to "insist
that all Jews of non-German nationality 'should be deprived of their
citizenship either prior to, or, at the latest, on the day of deporta-
tion' .... 165 A critical feature of the Nazi program was to change legal
conditions so that Jews were no longer lawfully in their country of resi-
dence, and therefore could be deported. 166 The results of this change in
status were horrific; as one concerned observer expressed, "[t]he whole
world knows what deportation means in practice.
1 67
This background sheds light on Pictet's use of quotation marks in the
following passage:
There is doubtless no need to give an account here of the painful
recollections called forth by the "deportations" of the Second
World War, for they are still present in everyone's memory. It
will suffice to mention that millions of human beings were torn
from their homes, separated from their families and deported
from their country, usually under inhumane conditions. These
mass transfers took place for the greatest possible variety of rea-
sons, mainly as a consequence of the formation of a forced la-
bour service. The thought of the physical and mental suffering
endured by these "displaced persons", among whom there were a
great many women, children, old people and sick, can only lead
to thankfulness for the prohibition embodied in this paragraph,
162. See ARENDT, supra note 150, at 170-71.
163. See id. at 150-53.
164. See id. at 176-82. International and domestic protests halted the Hungarian deportation
program. See id. at 182.
165. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 280 (2d enlarged ed. 1958)
[hereinafter ARENDT, ORIGINS]. Arendt explains that stripping Jews of nationality served two
purposes in addition to facilitating deportation: "The legal experts drew up the necessary legisla-
tion for making the victims stateless, which was important on two counts: it made it impossible
for any country to inquire into their fate, and it enabled the state in which they were resident to
confiscate their property." ARENDT, supra note 150, at 102.
166. See Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 45 Pesakim Mehoziim 3, para. 63 (D.C. Je-
rusalem 1961) (Isr.), translated in 36 INT'L L. REP. 5, 89 (1968) ("'This is like an automated fac-
tory.... At the one end you put in a Jew... and he goes through the whole building from counter to
counter, from office to office, and comes out the other end without any money, without any
rights, with only a passport in which it says: 'You must leave the country within a fortnight: oth-
erwise-you will go to a concentration camp."') (Testimony of a witness who had visited the Vi-
enna Emigration Center).
167. Letter from Angelo Rotta, Papal Nuntio in Hungary, to D6me Szt6jay, Prime Minister of
Hungary (May 15, 1944), in EUGENE LEVAI, BLACK BOOK ON THE MARTYRDOM OF
HUNGARIAN JEWRY 197, 197 (1948).
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which is intended to forbid such hateful practices for all time. 168
Here, Pictet is recalling a lesson of recent history: what an occupying
power may call a "deportation" under local immigration law may actu-
ally be a pretense to serve a sinister purpose. 69 Hence, Article 49 pro-
hibits actual deportations and Nazi-style "deportations," for during
times of occupation, it is not possible to determine which is which.
This historical perspective also explains the rationale for the descrip-
tion in Article 4 of protected persons, which was deliberately worded so
as to include stateless persons, 170 who might be unlawfully present in an
occupied country. The text, related commentary, and an historical un-
derstanding of Nazi practices during World War II indicate that local
immigration law should not be used to carve out an exception to Article
49 or any other provision of the Geneva Civilian Convention.'
7
'
b. Goldsmith's Appeal to "Common Sense"
Goldsmith contends that his conclusion "comports with common
sense," 172 and that it would be illogical to transform an occupied terri-
tory into a shelter for people who enter it in violation of local immigra-
tion law. 173 He correctly observes that the occupying power is under a
general obligation to maintain and enforce the domestic laws of the oc-
168. Pictet, civilian COMMENTARY, supra note I1, at 278-79. Goldsmith relies heavily on
this passage to conclude that persons can only be deported if they are "torn from their homes."
See Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 370, 376-77. He fails to account for the quotation marks sur-
rounding the word deportations, which are clearly understood to reference the trumped-up depor-
tations based on Nazi-imposed changes in local immigration laws, which stripped many of their
citizenship. If the word "deportation" at the time only meant removal of persons lawfully present
in a place, then the heated dispute between the Germans and French authorities in occupied
France regarding denaturalization of French Jews would have been pointless. See supra note 16 1.
Instead, stripping persons of citizenship, and therefore denying them the lawful right to be in a
place, was understood to be a necessary precondition for their deportation. For a discussion of the
consequences of statelessness in the twentieth century, both at a societal level and in terms of
human rights of those deprived of citizenship, see ARENDT, ORIGINS, supra note 165, at 276-302.
169. See, e.g., MARRUS & PAXTON, supra note 160, at 220 ("[A]ll the Jews of France were to
be deported, apparently without distinction or regard for French citizenship. The Final Solution
had begun.").
170. See Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 47 ("It will be observed that owing
to its negative form the definition [of protected person in Article 4] covers persons without any
nationality.").
17 1. See also Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition
Under International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 309, 328-30 (2006) (demonstrating that
Goldsmith's interpretation of the terms "deportation" and "transfer" are not consistent with tradi-
tional means of treaty interpretation).
172. Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 372.
173. Id.
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cupied country. 174 Yet as Goldsmith concedes, construing Article 49 to
prohibit deportations of individuals not lawfully present in a country
would still allow the occupying power to enforce local immigration law
by imprisoning persons present in the country illegally; they simply
would not be deportable. 175 This concession undercuts his conclusion
that it would be irrational to require an occupied country to set out a
"welcome mat" to people entering the country in violation of local im-
migration laws. 1
76
c. Goldsmith's Contention That the Occupying Power Is Obliged
to Enforce Local Laws Is Deceptive and Contrary To Explicit
Provisions in the Conventions
Goldsmith draws on "customary international law as reflected in Ar-
ticle 43 of the Hague Regulations" to conclude that "the occupying
power may be obliged to enforce Iraqi immigration law.... ,177 But Arti-
cle 43 calls on the occupying power to "respect[], unless absolutely pre-
vented, the laws in force in the country."'178 The Goldsmith memoran-
dum, however, provides no insights as to the content of Iraqi
immigration law prior to occupation, nor does it establish that U.S. and
other coalition forces in Iraq are in compliance with such laws them-
selves, or that they are striving to enforce these pre-existing laws.
Yet even if the basis for deportation or involuntary transfer is Iraqi
immigration law in existence prior to occupation, an occupying power is
prohibited from enforcing such law if enforcement would violate Article
49. Goldsmith draws on the Hague Convention to contend that the oc-
cupying power has an obligation to enforce local law, but he curiously
fails to mention provisions in the Geneva Civilian Convention itself that
relate to the responsibility of the occupying power to respect local laws.
Article 64 stipulates that:
The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force,
with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the
Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its
security or an obstacle to the application of the present Conven-
tion....
The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of
174. Id. at 373.
175. Id. at 374.
176. Id. at 372.
177. Id. at 374 (emphasis added).
178. Hague Convention, supra note 48, art. 43 (emphasis added).
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the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable
the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations under the present
Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory,
and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power.... 179
Pictet clarifies that the entire legal system-criminal and civil-is to be
maintained by the occupying power.' 80 To the extent that prior Iraqi civil
or criminal laws allowed for deportation in certain circumstances, the
first paragraph of Article 64 permits the occupying power to repeal or
suspend those provisions, because they pose an obstacle to the applica-
tion of Article 49 of the Geneva Civilian Convention.
It is unclear precisely which Iraqi immigration laws might justify de-
portation or involuntary transfer of terror suspects from occupied Iraq.
Goldsmith cites two provisions of Iraq's Law on Foreigners Resi-
dence' 8' to demonstrate that it grants authority to detain and deport for-
eigners (or "illegal aliens," in Goldsmith's language), 8 2 but he fails to
examine the substance of that law beyond the simple fact that it allows
for deportations. Deportation provisions, however, are limited to those
foreigners in violation of Articles 3, 6, 8, 11, and 20 of the Law on For-
eigners Residence.' 83 Those articles include provisions requiring for-
eigners to: enter with a valid passport, obtain an entry visa, and fill in an
arrival form;' 84 submit relevant information and photographs when ap-
plying for a visa;' 85 obtain an exit visa if present in Iraq subsequent to
an employment contract;' 8 6 obtain a residence permit if wishing to stay
beyond the time prescribed in the visa; 187 and receive permission from
the Minister of Interior if they wish to re-enter Iraq after having been
deported.188 But these provisions must be executed consistent with other
179. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 64.
180. See Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 335 ("The idea of the continuity of
the legal system applies to the whole of the law (civil law and penal law) in the occupied territory.
The reason for the Diplomatic Conference making express reference only to respect for penal law
was that it had not been sufficiently observed during past conflicts; there is no reason to infer a
contrario that the occupation authorities are not also bound to respect the civil law of the country,
or even its constitution.").
181. Law on Foreigners Residence No. 118 (1978) (entered into force Nov. 5, 1978), avail-
able at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.htm?tbl=RSDLEGAL&page=
home&id=3ae6b4ed0 [hereinafter Foreigner Residence Law].
182. Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 374.
183. See Foreigner Residence Law, supra note 181, art. 24.
184. Id. art. 3.
185. Id. art. 6.
186. Id. art. 8.
187. Id. art. 11.
188. Id. art. 20.
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provisions of Iraqi law, as well as the Constitution of Iraq. In particular,
Resolution No. 360 of 1991 eliminates the entry visa requirement for
"Arabs and foreigners for which bilateral and multi[-lateral] agreements
concluded among their states and the Republic of Iraq have been stipu-
lated to exempt them from condition of getting the entry visa to Iraq on
the basis of reciprocity."' 8 9 An earlier example of this reciprocity is evi-
denced in Resolution No. 455 of 1989, which eliminated entry and exit
visa requirements for nationals of the Arab Cooperation Council.' 90
Hence, nationals of countries with visa-waiver reciprocity would rarely
be in violation of the handful of Iraqi immigration laws which are con-
sidered to be deportable offenses.' 91 Also, the Law on Foreigners Resi-
dence excludes from its provisions "Arab citizens," as long as they
comply with the exit visa requirement imposed on foreigners present in
the country due to work contracts.' 92 Therefore, citizens of Arab coun-
tries are allowed visa-free entry, and could probably only be deported if
they attempted to leave the country while under an employment contract
in Iraq without first obtaining an exit visa. 193 Goldsmith makes no refer-
ence whatsoever to this substantial limitation on the general power to
deport under the Law on Foreigners Residence.
The Iraqi Constitution of 1990 also prohibits the extradition of politi-
cal refugees, 94 and grants the right of political asylum "for all militants,
189. Resolution No. 360 of 1991, 2 (entered into force Oct. 30, 1991) available at
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.htm?tbl=RSDLEGAL&page-home&id
=3 ae6b5I d 10 [hereinafter Entry Visa Resolution].
190. Resolution No. 455 of 1989, entered into force July 17, 1989, para. 1, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.htm?tbl=RSDLEGAL&page=home&id
=3ae6b5 1d4. Members of the Council were Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen. Curtis R. Ryan,
"Jordan First": Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations and Foreign Policy Under King Abdullah, 3
ARAB STUD. Q. 43, 52 (July 1, 2004). The Council dissolved in the wake of the 1990-91 Gulf
War. Id.
191. Presumably they could be in violation of provisions requiring them to enter with a valid
passport, fill in an arrival form, obtain an exit visa, or receive permission to re-enter after a previ-
ous deportation. See Foreigner Residence Law, supra note 18 1, arts. 3, 8, 20.
192. Foreigner Residence Law, supra note 181, art. 2, para. 1 ("Arab citizens shall be ex-
cluded from the provisions of this Law with observance of the provisions of para (a) of Article 8
thereof."). This law may have been changed somewhat. As of 2002, persons carrying passports
from Jordan, Syria, and Yemen could enter Iraq without an entry visa. See BBC Monitoring In-
ternational Reports, Iraqi Spy Chief Says Abu-Nidal Committed Suicide to Escape Arrest (Iraqi
Satellite Channel television broadcast Aug. 21, 2002) (statement of Tahir Jalil al-Habbushi). Al-
Habbushi was then the head of the Iraqi intelligence service. Id. Apparently nationals of other
Arab countries were automatically granted entry visas at the border. See id. ("We also grant other
Arab brothers entry visas directly at any border post or when they report to any Iraqi embassy.").
193. See Foreigner Residence Law, supra note 181, art. 2, para. 1; id. art. 8, para. 1.
194. IRAQ INTERIM CONST., art. 34(b) (1990), available at http://expired.oefre.unibe.ch/
law/icl/iz01000_.html, superseded by LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR
THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD (2004), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html
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persecuted in their countries because of defending the liberal and human
principles which are assumed by the Iraqi People in this Constitu-
tion." 195 Another provision of Iraqi law under Saddam Hussein stripped
Iraqis of their citizenship if they sought refuge abroad.196 It is unclear to
what extent these immigration provisions have been enforced by the oc-
cupying forces, 197 and Goldsmith makes no mention of them in his dis-
cussion of "local immigration laws" in Iraq. Notably, the Law on For-
eigners Residence makes no mention of "illegal alien" status, on which
Goldsmith relies.
d. Changes in Iraqi Immigration Law Since Occupation Began Are
Suspect and Not Enforceable
Less than two months after the end of "major combat operations" in
Iraq,198 Paul Bremer, Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Author-
ity (CPA), dramatically changed "local" Iraqi immigration laws by issu-
ing an order in June 2003.199 It is unclear whether Goldsmith specifi-
cally took these changes into account, but they had been in effect in Iraq
for nine months prior to the date his memorandum was issued. These
laws preempted any conflicting provisions in pre-existing Iraqi immi-
gration laws.200 The June 2003 CPA Order imposed a permit system on
[hereinafter LAW FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD], superseded by IRAQ CONST. (2005), avail-
able at http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/files/20704/11332732681 iraqi-constitutionen.pdf/
iraqi-constitution-en.pdf The current Iraqi Constitution also prohibits the transfer of political
refugees to a foreign body. See IRAQ CONST., supra, art. 21, para. 2.
195. Id. art. 34(a). The Transitional Constitution contained a similar provision: "No political
refugee who has been granted asylum pursuant to applicable law may be surrendered or returned
forcibly to the country from which he fled." LAW FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, supra note
194, art. 19.
196. See Hannah Allam, Drafters of Iraq's Constitution Grapple with Dual Citizenship,
KNIGHT RIDDER WASH. BUREAU, July 26, 2005. This law is expressly reversed in the current
constitution of Iraq. See IRAQ CONST., supra note 194, art. 18, para. 3.
197. Most members of the interim Iraqi administration are nationals of countries other than
Iraq. See Allam, supra note 196. While a strict application of earlier Iraqi law would consider
them not to be dual nationals, that law does not seem to have been an impediment to their entry
into the country or to their assumption of leadership positions in the country's government. See
id.
198. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
199. See COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, ORDER NO. 16, TEMPORARY CONTROL OF
IRAQI BORDERS, PORTS AND AIRPORTS (entered into force June 27, 2003), available at
http://www.defenselink.mi1/dodgc/ia/docs/CPAORDI6iraqi borders.pdf [hereinafter JUNE CPA
BORDER ORDER].
200. See id. sec. 2, para. 2 ("Wherever a stipulation or provision of this Order or any other
CPA Regulation, Order or Memorandum conflicts with a current provision of Iraqi immigration,
emigration, customs and quarantine laws, the stipulation or provision contained in such Regula-
tion, Order or Memorandum shall prevail.").
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non-Iraqis who are not Coalition personnel or United Nations offi-
cials. 20 1 Presumably, the CPA Order required non-Iraqis present in Iraq
prior to the imposition of the permit scheme to apply for and receive a
permit in order to remain in the country.20 2 Also, because some had been
able to enter the country under the previous laws without a visa,20 3 they
may have difficulty demonstrating legal presence when applying for a
permit. Under the terms of the CPA Order, a permit may be denied if an
officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the permit applicant "will
commit offenses, or engage in criminal activity,"20 4 or:
will engage in or has engaged in an act of terrorism, or is a mem-
ber of a terrorist organization or an organization that there are
reasonable grounds to believe will: i) engage in acts which are
offensive to the principles of democratic government, institutes
or processes, in Iraq; or ii) engage in or instigate the removal by
force of any government.20 5
Permits must be renewed every 90 days,20 6 and may be revoked if "the
presence of the person in Iraq is, or would be, a risk to the health, safety
or good order of the Iraqi community."20 7 Penalties for remaining in the
country without a required permit include deportation.20 8 Also, even
Iraqi nationals may be denied entry "because of security or military ne-
cessity. 20
9
It is noteworthy that the CPA Order makes no mention of the Iraqi
Constitution's express grant of the right to political asylum or of the
201. See id. sec. 5, para. 2.
202. The June 2003 CPA Order is unclear on this point. The permit requirement is imposed
on "[p]ersons seeking entry to Iraq." Id. sec. 5, para. I. But the CPA Order also lists as an of-
fense, "remaining in Iraq without a permit, where a person requires a permit." Id. sec. 13, para.
l(g). Most non-Iraqis residing in Iraq originally entered the country legally, but their passports
may be considered invalid if they have not returned to their home country to renew them. See
Kim Sengupta, Iraqis Claim 85 Rebels Dead in Capture of Training Camp, BELFAST TEL., Mar.
24, 2005 ("Most of the foreign residents originally possessed valid documents... [b]ut the docu-
ments are now deemed to be invalid if they have not returned to their home countries to renew
their passports and entry visas, a difficult task in a land racked by years of conflict and shackled
by United Nations sanctions.").
203. See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
204. JUNE CPA BORDER ORDER, supra note 199, at sec. 7, para. l(e).
205. Id. sec. 7, para. 1(f).
206. See id. sec. 5, para. I ("Officers shall issue permits valid for up to 90 days....").
207. Id. sec. 9, para. 1(c).
208. See id. see. 13, para. l(g); id. sec. 14.
209. See id. see. 7, para. 2.
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prohibition on extradition of political refugees.210 The Law of Admini-
stration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (Law for the
Transitional Period), established by the CPA on March 8, 2004, only
states that political refugees "who ha[ve] been granted asylum pursuant
to applicable law" may not be forcibly returned to the country from
which they fled.211 It is unclear whether there is any such "applicable
law," given that the CPA Order governing border control makes no men-
tion of asylum. The Law for the Transitional Period also grants the Iraqi
Transitional Government "exclusive competence" to "[r]egulat[e] Iraqi
citizenship, immigration, and asylum." 212 Even this concession to the
authority of the Iraqi Transitional Government is preempted by the
CPA-promulgated border regulations allowing officers to deny entry to
Iraqi nationals "because of security or military necessity., 213 Hence, the
CPA arguably retained control over immigration for all non-Iraqis, as
well as any Iraqis seeking to enter the country.
Less than three months after Goldsmith's memorandum was issued,
and a mere two weeks before sovereignty was restored in Iraq, Paul
Bremer changed Iraq's immigration laws once again.214 Most of the
changes are relatively minor, but two amendments afforded officers new
detention powers which did not exist under the original June 2003 CPA
Order.215 First, a person "may be detained for up to forty-eight hours for
further examination upon entry and/or pending arrangements for his or
her return.... ,,26 This provision is unusual because it allows for deten-
tion not only "upon entry" but also "pending arrangements for... return."
Also, it indicates that the purpose of the detention is "for further exami-
210. IRAQ INTERIM CONST., supra note 194, art. 34, superseded by LAW FOR THE
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, supra note 194, art. 19, superseded by IRAQ CONST., supra note 194, art.
21, para. 2.
211. LAW FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, supra note 194, art. 19.
212. Id. art. 25, I(F) (emphasis added).
213. See JUNE CPA BORDER ORDER, supra note 199, sec. 7, para. 2. The Law for the Transi-
tional Period provides that, "[t]he laws, regulations, orders, and directives issued by the [CPA]
pursuant to its authority under international law shall remain in force until rescinded or amended
by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law." LAW FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD,
supra note 194, art. 26(c).
214. COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, ORDER No. 16 (Revised) (Amended),
TEMPORARY CONTROL OF IRAQI BORDERS, PORTS AND AIRPORTS (entered into force June 13,
2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040613_CPAORD_16
TemporaryControl of Iraqi-Borders..Ports Airports Rev Amd_.pdf [hereinafter
AMENDED CPA BORDER ORDER].
215. See id. sec. 4, para. 3; sec. 7, para. 2.
216. Id. sec. 4, para. 3. This provision did not exist in the original order. See JUNE CPA
BORDER ORDER, supra note 199, sec. 4.
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nation. 21 7 Accordingly, any person deemed deportable could be de-
tained for examination for up to forty-eight hours under the revised or-
der. Second, while the original order simply allowed for Iraqis to be
"denied entry" "because of security or military necessity," 218 the
amended order states that "such a person may be detained upon entry
into Iraq. 219
As demonstrated above, an occupying power may decline to enforce
local laws.22° Yet the Hague Convention calls for enforcement of laws
existing prior to occupation "unless absolutely prevented., 221 Therefore,
under the Hague Convention, the Coalition must make every attempt to
resolve inconsistencies between Iraqi immigration laws existing prior to
occupation and laws imposed by the occupying power during occupa-
tion in favor of the previously existing laws.
Hence, under both the Hague and Geneva Conventions, CPA immi-
gration laws could only repeal the provisions of the Law on Foreigners
Residence that allowed for deportation. Instead, the CPA immigration
laws expanded provisions for deportation. Given the fact that Article 49
of the Geneva Civilian Convention expressly prohibits deportations,222
the CPA immigration laws are clearly not essential to fulfilling the obli-
gations of the occupying power. They are therefore impermissible under
the terms of the second paragraph of Article 64 of the Geneva Civilian
Convention, which only permits the occupying power to enact "provi-
sions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its ob-
ligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly govern-
ment of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying
Power., 223 The absolute prohibition on deportations in Article 49 dem-
onstrates that there can be no circumstances in which deportations may
be justified as essential to "maintain[ing] the orderly government of the
territory" and "ensur[ing] the security of the Occupying Power." Article
64 reinforces the principle that any form of deportation-whether under
the Law on Foreigners Residence, or under the CPA immigration laws-
is not permissible and may not be justified as an attempt to enforce the
217. AMENDED CPA BORDER ORDER, supra note 214, sec. 4, para. 3.
218. See JUNE CPA BORDER ORDER, supra note 199, sec. 7, para. 2.
219. AMENDED CPA BORDER ORDER, supra note 214, sec. 7, para. 2 (emphasis added).
220. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
221. Hague Convention, supra note 48, art. 43; see also RICHARD 1. MILLER, THE LAW OF
WAR 96 (1975) (noting that Article 43 is based on the premise that "it is conducive to a stable
occupation and the quiescence of the inhabitants if the existing laws, institutions, and customs are
respected to the maximum extent") (emphasis added).
222. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 49.
223. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 64, para. 2 (emphasis added).
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laws of the occupied territory.
An additional provision further strengthens the conclusion that
changes in local immigration laws may not be used to bring about de-
portations. Article 47 of the Geneva Civilian Convention states:
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be de-
prived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits
of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result
of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or govern-
ment of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded be-
tween the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupy-
ing Power ... 224
Pictet's Commentary demonstrates that this provision was enacted with
the practices of German occupying forces in the forefront of the minds
of members of the diplomatic conference:
The position of Article 47 at the beginning of the Section dealing
with occupied territories underlines the cardinal importance of
the safeguards it proclaims. During the Second World War whole
populations were excluded from the application of the laws gov-
erning occupation and were thus denied the safeguards provided
by those laws and left at the mercy of the Occupying Power. In
order to avoid a repetition of this state of affairs, the authors of
the Convention made a point of giving these rules an absolute
character.225
Pictet's Commentary becomes even more specific: "Cases have in fact
occurred where the authorities of an occupied territory have, under pres-
sure from the Occupying Power,...tolerated the forcible... deportation of
protected persons by the occupying authorities. 226 This analysis explic-
itly supports the prohibition on an occupying power altering local laws
to deny persons the protection of the Convention. Deportation under
CPA immigration laws would deny a person those protections, and ac-
cordingly would violate Article 47, as well as Article 49. Therefore, had
Goldsmith looked to the Geneva Civilian Convention itself, rather than
to his narrow reading of customary international law and the Hague
Convention, he would have discovered a clear prohibition of the use of
local immigration laws to carve an exception out of Article 49's abso-
lute prohibition on deportation.
224. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 47.
225. Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 273.
226. Id. at 275.
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As noted above, it is unclear whether the Goldsmith memorandum is
attempting to justify deportations under the new immigration provisions
enacted by the Coalition Provisional Authority. If Goldsmith was at-
tempting to justify deportations under either of the new deportation
laws, his logic could just as easily have been used to justify the changes
in local residency and nationality laws effected by German occupying
forces in Europe during World War II. While Article 49 clearly prohibits
deportations during occupation even when they would otherwise be
permissible under pre-existing local laws, there is no doubt that the par-
ties to the diplomatic conference did not intend to allow the occupying
power to change local immigration laws to bring about deportations;
that tactic is precisely the method used by Nazi Germany to bring about
the Holocaust, which was in the minds of the diplomats at Geneva.227
Distinctions between the old Iraqi laws and new CPA laws may be of
particular importance to Palestinians who made Iraq their home with
Saddam Hussein's blessing. Iraq under Saddam Hussein had provided
refuge to many Palestinians. 228 In 2000, the Iraqi government granted
home-ownership rights to 60,000 Palestinians living in Iraq.229 Perhaps
due to this historical support, most Palestinians living in Iraq were
viewed as strong supporters of Saddam Hussein. 230 As the Iraq War
commenced in early 2003, some Palestinians were attacked and threat-
ened with expulsion.2 3 1 The fate of Palestinians under Iraq's changed
immigration laws is uncertain, particularly if they are suspected of hav-
ing links to terrorist activities. 32 Given the considerable size of the Pal-
227. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
228. See Pamela Constable, In Postwar Iraq, Fortunes of Palestinians Worsen, WASH. POST,
Aug. 3, 2003, at A15 ("[Palestinians] were once part of former president Saddam Hussein's fa-
vorite foreign cause."); Ahmad S. Moussalli, The Geopolitics of Syrian-Iraqi Relations, MIDDLE
E. POL'Y, Oct. 1, 2000, at 107. Since 1991, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have been ex-
pelled from Kuwait and other Gulf states as a result of the Palestinian Liberation Authority's sup-
port for Saddam Hussein in the 1990-91 war. See Khaled Abu Toameh, Bleak Future Awaits Pal-
estinians in Post-Saddam Iraq, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 28, 2003, at 3. Many fled to Iraq. Id.
229. See Moussalli, supra note 228, at 107.
230. See Palestinians in Iraq Fear Expulsion, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 22, 2003 ("The Pales-
tinian community of more than 40,000 is regarded by Iraqi opposition leaders as some of the most
faithful followers of Saddam.").
231. Id.; see also NBC Nightly News: Palestinians Now Facing Homelessness in Iraq (NBC
television broadcast, May 10, 2003).
232. See Constable, supra note 228 (noting that three Palestinian diplomats had been taken
into custody, and that the United States was investigating possible links between the Palestinian
embassy and terrorist activities); Iraqi Shi'i "Collaborators" Attack Palestinians, AL-QUDS (Je-
rusalem), May 25, 2005, reprinted in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, May 28, 2005 (describing
recent assaults on Palestinians by the Iraqi Interior Ministry's "Wolf Brigade"). But see Iraqi For-
eign Minister Comments on Relations with Syria, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT (London), Mar. 23,
2004, reprinted in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Mar. 23, 2004 ("Regarding the Palestinians liv-
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estinian population in Iraq, and the fact that there may not be a country
which will accept them upon deportation, this particular category of
non-Iraqis may be in grave danger and warrants heightened protection
under the Geneva Civilian Convention.
233
Egyptians living in Iraq are also perceived by the current Iraqi ad-
ministration as loyal to Saddam Hussein's government, 234 and during
the U.S. occupation there were Egyptian detainees in U.S. custody in
Iraq.235 Given perceptions of their allegiance to Hussein, they may be
subject to forced transfer out of the country under Iraq's new immigra-
tion laws.236 If they are deported to Egypt, there is a strong likelihood
that they will be subjected to torture and other forms of ill-treatment at
the hands of the Egyptian government.
237
Less than one year after the second time that the CPA amended Iraqi
immigration laws, the Iraqi government again tightened national resi-
dency rules and began detention and deportation of non-Iraqis living in
the country.238 Because the U.S. forces in Iraq arguably are still gov-
erned by the Geneva Civilian Convention,239 these deportations also
could run afoul of Article 49.
While it is unclear to what extent Goldsmith's memorandum is pro-
viding legal authorization for forced transfer of non-Iraqis based on pre-
existing Iraqi immigration laws or the more restrictive immigration laws
imposed by the CPA or even the Iraqi government itself, in either case
ing in Iraq, they will be treated like the Iraqis.") (statement of Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Ze-
bari).
233. Cf supra notes 150-69 and accompanying text (discussing the fate of stateless Jews in
Europe during World War II).
234. See Egypt, Iraq Said in Dispute over Treatment of Iraq-Based Egyptians, AL-HAYAT
(London), Oct. 1, 2003, reprinted in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Oct. 3, 2003.
235. See id.
236. See supra notes 199-219. The destination of these transfers is unclear. The Egyptian
government has demonstrated a high level of cooperation in the extraordinary rendition program,
see Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Peter Finn, U.S. Behind Secret Transfer of Terror Suspects, WASH.
POST, Mar. 11, 2002, at A1, and therefore would seem to be a natural destination for transfers of
Egyptian nationals. The only officially recognized rendition from Iraq involved Hiwa Abdul
Rahman Rashul, who was transferred to Afghanistan for interrogation. See Priest, supra note 2.
Evidently, Rashul is an Iraqi citizen. See Mark Fass, Rumsfeld ID's Secret Detainee, DAILY
NEWS (N.Y.), June 20, 2004, at 34 (describing Rashul as an "Iraqi prisoner").
237. See Agiza v. Sweden, Decision of the Committee Against Torture, Communication No.
233/203, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005), at 34, 13.4; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2004, EGYPT (2005), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41720.htm; Stephen Grey, America's Gulag, NEW
STATESMAN, May 17, 2004, at 22.
238. See Alissa J. Rubin, Iraq Moves to Expel Foreign Arabs, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2005, at
AI. The policy was established by the Iraqi administration in February 2005. See id.
239 See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
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Article 49's prohibition on deportation and forcible transfer conducted
by an occupying power is absolute. Hence, forcible transfer of terror
suspects from Iraq violates Article 49, regardless of whether the sus-
pects are in violation of any local immigration law.
2. Goldsmith Gap Two
Goldsmith attempts to set forth an additional gap in Article 49 of the
Geneva Civilian Convention. He contends that protected persons in oc-
cupied Iraq may be relocated from Iraq "temporarily, to facilitate inter-
rogation" as long as those persons have not been accused of any of-
fense. 240 Goldsmith presents several arguments in support of his
conclusion. First, he argues that the explicit prohibition on removal of
protected persons who are accused of crimes suggests that individuals
not accused of crimes may be removed, provided that the removal is not
permanent. Second, he contends that provisions allowing for the transfer
of orphaned children demonstrate that the prohibition only applies to in-
dividuals who are being permanently uprooted from their homes. Third,
he asserts that the terms "deportation" and "transfer" are used in another
part of Article 49 to exclude temporary relocations. Fourth, he contends
that if Article 49 contained an absolute prohibition on involuntary trans-
fers, then two other provisions in the Geneva Civilian Convention
would be rendered superfluous. This section explores each argument in
turn, and demonstrates that Goldsmith's reasoning is unpersuasive.
Goldsmith first takes note that Article 76 explicitly provides that,
"Protected persons accused of offences shall be detained in the occupied
country, and if convicted they shall serve their sentences therein." 241 For
persons not accused of offenses, Goldsmith contends that forcible trans-
fers and deportations prohibited within the context of Article 49 only
involve actions that permanently uproot a person from his or her
home. 24
2
As noted above, Goldsmith's reading of the term deportations as lim-
ited to removal of persons lawfully in a place is inconsistent with the
text and historical impetus for Article 49. Moreover, while deportation
may indeed connote permanence, transfer does not. This distinction is
evidenced by Pictet's Commentary to Article 45, which governs the
conditions for voluntary transfer. He explains that, "Any movement of
protected persons to another State, carried out by the Detaining Power
240. Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 374-79.
241. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 76.
242. Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 376.
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on an individual or collective basis, is considered as a transfer for the
purposes of Article 45. The term 'transfer', for example, may mean in-
ternment in the territory of another Power.... 243 Because internment is
a temporary and prohibited transfer, the drafters of the Conventions did
not intend to prohibit only permanent transfers.
Goldsmith then looks to other provisions of the Convention to make
the argument that a prohibition on non-permanent transfers would create
structural inconsistencies within the Convention. 244 His second argu-
ment notes that Article 24 calls for the relocation of orphans under age
15 to neutral countries for the duration of the conflict, and argues that
the only reasonable way to reconcile Articles 24 and 49 is that Article
49 only prohibits uprooting persons from their homes, and because or-
phans have already been uprooted, the two provisions do not conflict.
There are several flaws in his construction of Article 24. First, Article
24's provisions for "reception of [orphans] in a neutral country" does
not govern countries under occupation; it only applies "for the duration
of the conflict '245 and is not one of the articles listed as binding on oc-
cupying powers staying beyond one year.246 Hence, within the context
of occupation, rather than ongoing armed conflict, Article 24 creates no
inconsistency with the strict interpretation of Article 49 presented
above. Second, such reception can be interpreted as a voluntary transfer,
because the parties to the conflict are in essence acting in loco parentis
to determine the best interests of orphaned children.247 Such a transfer
can hardly be considered either a "deportation" or a "forcible transfer"
prohibited by Article 49; instead, it is a presumably voluntary transfer
consistent with the voluntary transfers allowed under Article 45. This
argument is strengthened by the observation that Article 24 does not de-
fine orphans as children already uprooted from their homes, as Gold-
smith asserts,248 but instead defines them as children "who are orphaned
or are separated from their families.... ,249 An orphan may still be at
home and subject to lawful transfer from that home consistent with the
provisions of Articles 24 and 49. Further, Goldsmith's conclusion that
transfers not constituting permanent uprooting from one's home are
243. Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 266 (emphasis added).
244. Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 376-79.
245. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 24.
246. See supra text accompanying note 60.
247. See Luban, supra note 138, at 2-3.
248. See Goldsmith, supra note 133 at 377 ("The children provided for in [A]rticle 24 are
precisely those who have been orphaned or separated from their homes already, by the war.").
249. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 24 (emphasis added).
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permissible contradicts Pictet's Commentary on Article 49, which states
that "[t]he prohibition [against deportation and forcible transfer] is abso-
lute and allows of no exceptions, apart from the provisions stipulated in
paragraph 2. " 250
In advancing his third argument, Goldsmith identifies a second seem-
ing inconsistency within Article 49 itself. The final paragraph of Article
49 provides that, "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer
parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies., 251 He
notes that Nazi Germany engaged in permanent resettlement of ethnic
Germans into conquered lands as part of the effort to "Germanize" oc-
cupied territories.252 Goldsmith also observes that frequently an occupy-
ing power will temporarily relocate civilian personnel into the occupied
territory to serve as support staff for the occupying power.253 Accord-
ingly, he argues, the provisions of Paragraph 6 demonstrate that the
terms "deport or transfer" only apply to permanent movement of per-
sons across borders. Goldsmith then asserts that the same words bear the
same meaning throughout the same treaty254 and concludes that the pro-
hibitions on forcible transfers and deportations in Article 49(1) do not
include temporary forcible transfers or deportations.
While Goldsmith makes reference to Pictet's Commentary in other
parts of his analysis, he fails to mention it in this part of his argument,
presumably because Pictet flatly contradicts Goldsmith's conclusion
that the words "deportation" and "transfer" in Article 49(6) have the
same meaning as those same words in Article 49(1):
[Paragraph 6] provides protected persons with a valuable safe-
guard. It should be noted, however, that in this paragraph the
meaning of the words 'transfer' and 'deport' is rather different
from that in which they are used in the other paragraphs of Arti-
cle 49, since they do not refer to the movement of protected per-
sons but to that of nationals of the occupying Power.
It would therefore appear to have been more logical-and this
was pointed out at the Diplomatic Conference-to have made the
clause in question into a separate provision distinct from Article
49, so that the concepts of 'deportations' and 'transfers' in that
Article could have kept throughout the meaning given them in
250. Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 279.
251. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 49, para. 6.
252. See Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 377.
253. See id. at 378.
254. See id. at 377 (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 398 (1985)).
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paragraph 1, i.e. the compulsory movement of protected persons
from occupied territory.255
Therefore, Pictet's Commentary is sufficient to overcome any presump-
tion that the terms as used in the first paragraph carry the same meaning
as the terms as used in the sixth paragraph.
Fourth, Goldsmith indicates that an absolute prohibition on forced
transfers and deportations in Article 49 would render Articles 51 and 76
superfluous. 256 Article 51 describes the conditions under which an occu-
pying power may compel protected persons to work.25 7 Paragraph 3
provides that, "[t]he work shall be carried out only in the occupied terri-
tory where the persons whose services have been requisitioned are."
258
Goldsmith contends that if Article 49 prohibited even temporary trans-
fers, Article 51 would not be necessary. Pictet's Commentary, however,
takes into consideration that this provision is subsumed by Article 49,
and explains the basis for its repetition:
The stipulation that protected persons may not be employed on
work outside the occupied territory is already contained, as has
been seen, in Article 49, paragraph 1, which contains a general
prohibition of all "deportations", but in view of the unhappy ex-
periences of the last world war it seemed necessary to reaffirm
that essential principle here.259
This Commentary establishes two critical precepts to defeat Goldsmith's
faulty premise. First, the "redundancy" between Articles 49 and 51 is
acknowledged and explained. Second, and more importantly, the Com-
mentary tells us that Article 49 prohibits all "deportations," including
transfers which might take place solely for the purpose of work outside
the occupied territory.
As noted above, the first paragraph of Article 76 provides that pro-
tected persons accused of offenses must be detained in the occupied
country, and if they are convicted, they must serve their sentences in the
occupied country.260 Goldsmith argues that this article would be redun-
dant if Article 49 prohibited all deportations and involuntary transfers.
Instead of being superfluous, Article 76, as Pictet explains, "is based on
the fundamental principle forbidding deportations laid down in Article
255. Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 283.
256. Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 378-79.
257. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 4, art. 51.
258. Id. para. 3.
259. Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 298.
260. See supra text accompanying note 241.
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49. ' 26l Indeed, the Commentary for Article 49 notes the relationship
among the three articles in question:
The prohibition [against deportations and forcible transfers in Ar-
ticle 49(1)] is absolute and allows of no exceptions, apart from
those stipulated in paragraph 2 [relating to emergency evacua-
tions]. It is, moreover, strengthened by other Articles in the cases
in which its observance appeared to be least certain: in this con-
nection mention may be made of Article 51, paragraph [3262],
dealing with compulsory labour, [and] Article 76, paragraph 1,
concerning the treatment of protected persons accused of of-
fences or serving sentences .... 263
Rather than construing Articles 51 and 76 as hinting at an unstated ex-
ception to Article 49, Pictet confirms that they merely strengthen and
reinforce the absolute prohibition for cases in which there might be
some remaining uncertainty.
In a footnote on the penultimate page of his memorandum, Goldsmith
recognizes that his own conclusion runs contrary to Pictet's explicit
statement, and he responds to the contradiction as follows:
We do not find [Pictet's] reasoning persuasive. Article 49 may
well lay down a fundamental principle, but the scope of this
principle must be ascertained by traditional rules of treaty inter-
pretation, including the rule that each provision of a treaty "is to
be given a meaning, if reasonably possible, and rules of construc-
tion may not be resorted to [to] render it meaningless or inopera-
tive." Factor [v. Laubenheimer], 290 U.S. [276,] 303-04
[(1933)].264
The interpretation advanced in this footnote, however, renders meaning-
261. Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 363.
262. Pictet appears to be referencing paragraph three and not two.
263. Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 279 (emphasis added).
264. Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 379 n. 13. The use of this particular rule of treaty interpre-
tation is inconsistent with Goldsmith's own analysis of the distinction between "deportation" and
"forcible transfer." See supra note 254 and accompanying text. Indeed, the passage Goldsmith
cites from Factor makes reference not to treaty "provisions" but to "phrase[s]" and "words." Fac-
tor, 290 U.S. at 303-04. Interestingly, the provision interpreted by the court in Factor is "stolen
or unlawfully obtained." Id. at 303. Using Goldsmith's reasoning, things that are stolen are not
unlawfully obtained because if the two terms meant the same thing, one of the two words would
be superfluous. To the contrary, the Supreme Court held that the two terms used in tandem served
to strengthen one another, rather than for one to carve an exception out of the other. Id. ("What-
ever was left vague or uncertain by the use of the word 'stolen' was made certain by the added
phrase 'or unlawfully obtained,' as indicating any form of criminal taking whether or not em-
braced within the term larceny in its various connotations.").
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less Article 49's language prohibiting forcible transfers "regardless of
motive" and ignores the specific explanations offered in Pictet's authori-
tative Commentary. It is also noteworthy that nowhere in Goldsmith's
memorandum does he quote Pictet's clear statement about Article 49,
paragraph one: "The prohibition is absolute and allows of no excep-
tions, apart from those stipulated in paragraph 2. "265
The language of Article 49, viewed both within the larger context of
other provisions of the Geneva Civilian Convention and in light of Pic-
tet's Commentary, indicates that there is no exception lurking within the
article which allows for temporary forcible removal of protected per-
sons. 26 6 Hence, there is no exception to Article 49 which allows for tem-
porary removal of any protected person, whether "to facilitate interroga-
tion" or for other purposes-sinister or benign.267 Except in the rare
circumstances where U.S. or Coalition nationals would be subject to
forcible transfer, there is no gap in the Geneva Civilian Convention, at
265. Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 279. It would be difficult to argue that
Goldsmith simply overlooked these words. In fact, his parenthetical reference to Pictet's conclu-
sion suggests a concerted effort to avoid any reference to the words "The prohibition is absolute
and allows of no exceptions" in the above-quoted sentence. Goldsmith dodges this language by
using a clever paraphrase: "asserting without analysis that Article 49(l)'s prohibition is 'strength-
ened by other Articles....'" Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 379 n. 13.
266. Given the extensive committee work and negotiations relating to the Geneva Conven-
tions in the diplomatic conference prior to their enactment, it seems a stretch of the imagination
that the parties intended such an exception to exist without explicitly stating that it did, particu-
larly in light of the absolute language in the first paragraph of Article 49.
267. That Goldsmith's conclusion to the contrary may be motivated by less-than-benign in-
tent is indicated by the failure of any government authority to explain convincingly how or why
interrogations of Iraqis might be facilitated by removing them temporarily from Iraq. See Dana
Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations; 'Stress and Duress'
Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 26,
2002, at Al (reporting that U.S. officials assert that foreign allies are better suited for interroga-
tions "because of their cultural affinity with the captives"). In his final footnote, Goldsmith in-
cludes an oblique but foreboding reminder to those officials who might seek to use his memoran-
dum:
[Ajlthough we have previously indicated that only those who "find themselves... in the
hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power" in "occupied territory[,]"... receive
the benefits of "protected person" status,... this does not mean that a "protected person"
who is captured in occupied territory and then temporarily relocated by the occupying
power to a different location thereby forfeits the benefits of "protected person" status.
On the contrary, we believe he would ordinarily retain these benefits.
Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 379 n. 14. In other words, any "facilitation of interrogation" occur-
ring outside of Iraq must not be derived from an attempt to escape the other provisions of the Ge-
neva Civilian Convention, including the prohibitions of torture and inhuman treatment, listed as
grave breaches in Article 147. Perhaps Goldsmith foresaw that human rights organizations would
view his legal justifications for forcible transfer from Iraq as complicity in war crimes, and there-
fore inserted this footnote in an attempt to shield himself from culpability. See infra note 302.
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least as regards Article 49.268 Use of extraordinary rendition forcibly to
transfer persons protected under the Geneva Civilian Convention out of
Afghanistan or Iraq subsequent to occupation is therefore a war crime,
and no exceptions are allowed under the Convention for those persons
not lawfully present in the occupied territory or for temporary transfer.
V. MECHANISMS To CHALLENGE THE PRACTICE OF
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
When a High Contracting Party commits a grave breach of the Ge-
neva Conventions, there are several means to hold the offenders ac-
countable. First, there may be mechanisms within the domestic legal
system of the offending High Contracting Party. Second, international
judicial bodies may be able to assert jurisdiction over the offenders.
Third, other individual countries may initiate criminal prosecution of the
responsible officials. This Part addresses each of these approaches in
turn.
A. Mechanisms Within the U.S. Legal System
The United States ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions in 1955 and
they entered into force for the United States on February 2, 1956.269
Congress formally criminalized grave breaches in the War Crimes Act
of 1996.270 Section 2441(c)(1) of Title 18 defines war crimes to include
268. Evidently this view was close to Goldsmith's original position. See Priest, supra note 2
("In October [2003], White House counsel Alberto R. Gonzales asked the Office of Legal Coun-
sel to write an opinion on 'protected persons' in Iraq and rule on the status of [Hiwa Abdul Rah-
man] Rashul[, who had already been turned over to the CIA in June or July of 2003 and taken to
Afghanistan for interrogation].... Goldsmith.. ruled that Rashul was a 'protected person' under
the [Civilian] Geneva Convention [in a one-page interim ruling].... 'That case started the CIA
yammering to Justice to get a better memo,' said one intelligence officer familiar with the inter-
agency discussion.").
269. Congress did not enact implementing legislation at the time. The Attorney General's of-
fice had concluded that it was unnecessary because all requisite legislation was already in exis-
tence. See Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Foreign Rels., 84th Cong. 28-29 (1955) [hereinafter Geneva Convention Hearing] (statement
of Assistant Attorney General J. Lee Rankin); id. at 58 ("A review of existing legislation reveals
no need to enact further legislation in order to provide effective penal sanctions for those viola-
tions of the Geneva [C]onventions which are designated as grave breaches.") (letter from Assis-
tant Attorney General J. Lee Rankin to Senator Walter F. George, June 7, 1955). Rankin con-
cluded that only three statutory changes were required to implement the treaty: an amendment
relating to the use of the Red Cross emblem, renewal of a statute relating to imports of items for
prisoners of war, and possibly some worker's compensation legislation. See id. at 59.
270. Pub. L. No. 104-192, 110 Stat. 2104 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006)). Con-
gress deemed the 1996 implementing legislation necessary because legislators had identified
many situations in which prosecution of individuals committing grave breaches would have been
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a "grave breach in any of the international conventions signed at Ge-
neva 12 August 1949. ' '27I
There are convincing indications that the Bush Administration in-
tended to carve out an exception to allow the CIA to conduct interroga-
tions and renditions without being bound by any requirements that the
administration imposed on the Defense Department to afford detainees
humane treatment.272 Additionally, the Bush administration exerted con-
certed (but ultimately unsuccessful) efforts to force Congress to exempt
the CIA from an amendment sponsored by Senator John McCain pro-
hibiting cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of detainees in U.S.
custody.273 There is strong evidence to indicate that the CIA engages in
impossible under existing law, particularly when war crimes were committed outside of the
United States. H.R. REP. No. 104-698, at 4 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2166,
2169.
271. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(1).
272. See, e.g., Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Cer-
tain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 §§ 3(b), 2(a) (Nov.
13, 2001) (requiring that individuals subject to the order be "treated humanely" while detained by
the Department of Defense, but providing that an individual is only subject to the order if "it is in
the interest of the United States"); Bush, supra note 20, at 135 ("As a matter of policy, the United
States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely...."); Noah Feldman, Ugly
Americans, NEW REPUBLIC, May 30, 2005, at 23 (observing that the CIA is not bound by the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, and therefore "[i]t would follow that the CIA, unlike the mili-
tary, would be authorized to do anything except violate the U.S. anti-terror statute-which is pre-
cisely the statute whose reach the memoranda sought to diminish"); Nomination ofAlberto Gon-
zales to Be the Attorney General of the United States: Hearing of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. (Jan. 6, 2005) ("It has always been the case that everyone should be treated-that the
military would treat detainees humanely, consistent with the [P]resident's February order.")
(statement of Attorney General nominee Alberto Gonzales); Priest, supra note 2 (noting that the
Goldsmith memorandum of March 2004 was drafted "at the request of the CIA"); Status of Legal
Discussions re Application of Geneva Convention to Taliban and al Qaeda, in THE TORTURE
PAPERS, supra note 15, at 130, 132 ("CIA lawyers believe that, to the extent that [Geneva POW
Convention's] protections do not apply as a matter of law but those protections are applied as a
matter of policy, it is desirable to circumscribe that policy so as to limit its application to the CIA.
The other lawyers involved did not disagree with or object to CIA's view.") (unsigned record of a
discussion among administration lawyers); Understanding the OLC Torture Memos (Part I), Post-
ing of Marty Lederman, attorney-advisor at the Office of Legal Counsel from 1994-2002, to
Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/200501 02_balkinarchive.html (Jan. 7, 2005) [here-
inafter Lederman, Part I] ("All of this is [fairly] strong evidence that the Administration has gone
to significant lengths to preserve a significant CIA loophole.").
273. See Dep't of Defense Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, tit. X, § 1003, 119
Stat. 2680, 2735 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd); Eric Schmitt, President Backs McCain
on Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al; Jonathan Weisman, Senators Agree on Detainee
Rights, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2005, at A]. But see Statement on Signing the Department of De-
fense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico,
and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1918, 1919 (Dec. 30, 2005),
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/v4lno52.html (stating that the executive branch
shall construe the provisions "in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the
President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent
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extraordinary rendition in part to facilitate the use of degrading treat-
ment and torture, 274 and in part as an attempt to avoid culpability for
violations of the War Crimes Act. Legal memoranda for the CIA advise
that if they are contemplating procedures that may constitute violations
of U.S. law, "they will not be responsible if it can be argued that the de-
tainees are formally in the custody of another country." 275 In spite of this
formality, the CIA does retain control, because the governments accept-
ing the prisoners are expected to comply with CIA requests, 276 and be-
cause of collaboration between CIA officials and the authorities who in-
terrogate individuals who have been subjected to extraordinary
rendition.277 Therefore, the rendition of POWs or persons whose POW
with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power, which will assist in.. .protecting the
American people from further terrorist attacks").
274. See European Parliament Temporary Committee on the Alleged Use of European Coun-
tries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, Interim Report on the
Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of
Prisoners, EUR. PARL. DOc. A6-0213/2006 at 7-12 (June 15, 2006) [hereinafter Fava Report]
(reported by Giovanni Claudio Fava), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/
file.jsp?id=5309292.
275. James Risen et al., Harsh CIA Methods Cited in Top Qaeda Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 2004, at Al.
276. See David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture Con-
vention, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 619 (2006); see also Douglas Jehl, Pentagon Seeks to Shift In-
mates from Cuba Base, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2005, at Al (noting that Pentagon officials assert
that their transfers do not qualify as "renditions" "because the governments that accept the pris-
oners are not expected to carry out the will of the United States"). Presumably, therefore, gov-
ernments accepting prisoners in the CIA rendition program are expected to carry out the will of
the United States. This distinction was reiterated in two rulings in the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia when petitioners applied for injunctive relief to require thirty days' notice be-
fore transfer out of Guanthnamo. See Al-Anazi v. Bush, 370 F. Supp. 2d 188, 195-96 (D.D.C.
2005) (noting that Defense Department transfers are distinguished from CIA transfers because the
foreign countries are not expected to carry out the will of the United States when they accept Pen-
tagon detainees); Almurbati v. Bush, 366 F. Supp. 2d 72, 76-77 (D.D.C. 2005) (acknowledging
the "admittedly disturbing" newspaper reports of extraordinary rendition, but noting that Penta-
gon officials had provided declarations that the Defense Department obtains assurances and will
not transfer people to countries where the Pentagon believes it is more likely than not that they
will be tortured). Other judges hearing similar cases were not so trusting. See, e.g., Kurnaz v.
Bush, No. 04-1135, 2005 WL 839542, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2005); Al-Joudi v. Bush, No. 05-
301, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6265, at *21 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2005); Al-Marri v. Bush, No. 04-2035,.
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6259, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2005); Abdah v. Bush, No. 04-1254, 2005
WL 711814, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005).
277. Weissbrodt & Bergquist, supra note 276, at 619-21; Craig Whitlock, In Letter, Radical
Cleric Details CIA Abduction, Egyptian Torture, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2006, at A23; see Abu
Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 68-69 (D.D.C. 2004) (describing evidence of U.S./Saudi col-
laboration in the interrogation of a U.S. citizen detained by Saudi authorities); Jane Mayer, Out-
sourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's 'Extraordinary Rendition' Program, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106, 110 (reporting that CIA officials would give Egyptian interroga-
tors a list of questions in the morning, and receive a list of answers the same evening); Priest &
Gellman, supra note 267 (noting that the CIA gives intelligence services in Egypt, Jordan, and
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status is in doubt278 is likely to constitute a violation of the War Crimes
Act in nearly every circumstance where the detainee is kept incommu-
nicado or subjected to great suffering, inhuman treatment, or torture. v°
Moreover, forced transfer of persons protected under the Geneva Civil-
ian Convention is a grave breach no matter whether the transferring au-
thorities retain control over the individuals after transfer and regardless
of what happens to those individuals after leaving occupied territory.
Certainly the CIA is part of the U.S. government, and therefore any
statutory or treaty obligations imposed on U.S. officials with regard to
transfers or interrogations would extend to CIA personnel, despite this
apparent attempt to create an exception. Therefore, the CIA officials and
others in the U.S. government responsible for forcible transfers from
occupied Iraq and Afghanistan should be held accountable for their
criminal activities under the terms of the War Crimes Act. Nonetheless,
U.S. prosecutors are unlikely to pursue criminal prosecution of those of-
ficials at a time when such actions would be regarded as highly unpopu-
lar.2s° Moreover, Congress has enacted legislation that reduces the like-
lihood that U.S. personnel will be held accountable for violations of the
Morocco lists of questions it wants answered when it hands suspects over to authorities in those
countries); id. (reporting that in Saudi Arabia CIA officials observe live investigations through
one-way mirrors); Dana Priest & Joe Stephens, Secret World of U.S. Interrogation; Long History
of Tactics in Overseas Prisons Is Coming to Light, WASH. POST, May 11, 2004, at Al ("[Terror
suspects'] fate [when detained in Saudi Arabia] is largely controlled by Saudi-based joint intelli-
gence task forces, whose members include officers from the CIA, FBI and other U.S. law en-
forcement agencies."); id. ("[The United States and Saudi Arabia] are not 'cooperating' anymore;
we're doing it together.").
278. For persons not protected under the POW Convention, rendition may violate other provi-
sions of the Geneva Conventions, the Convention Against Torture, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, or other treaties. See Weissbrodt & Bergquist, supra note 3, at 132-47,
149-53.
279. See Geneva POW Convention, supra note 4, art. 130-31.
280. Individuals who are currently being held in violation of Article 49 may be able to invoke
the writ of habeas corpus to challenge their illegal transfer and subsequent detention. See Weiss-
brodt & Bergquist, supra note 3, at 158; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2794
n.57 (2006) (suggesting that rights under the 1949 Geneva Conventions may be individually en-
forceable). But see Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a)(2) (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 224 l(e)(2)) ("[Nbo court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear
or consider any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the
detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was de-
tained by the United States and has been determined by the United States to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination."); id. § 5(a) (amending the
Uniform Code of Military Justice to provide that "No person may invoke the Geneva Conven-
tions or any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding to which
the United States, or a current or former officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other
agent of the United States is a party as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its
States or territories").
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War Crimes Act. 281 As a result, criminal prosecution within the United
States is probably not a viable means to address extraordinary rendition
in violation of the Geneva Conventions.282
B. International Criminal Court
In October 2005, Mexico became the one-hundredth country to ratify
the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC).283
The ICC may have jurisdiction over officials responsible for extraordi-
nary rendition based on the territory where the crime occurs,28 4 and the
crime may be construed as occurring both in the country where the de-
tainee originates and in the country where the detainee is ultimately
held. The Rome Statute explicitly establishes jurisdiction over "unlaw-
ful deportation or transfer" "when committed as a part of a plan or pol-
icy."' 285 Exercise of ICC jurisdiction over U.S. nationals would likely
draw harsh criticism from the United States, 286 but it may also be a more
palatable means of bringing people to justice by not drawing attention to
one country's prosecutorial zeal.287 While the United States has been
successful in negotiating bilateral agreements with many countries to
281. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366 § 6 (to be codified at 18
U.S.C. § 2441(c),(d)) (revising retroactively the definition of grave breaches in the War Crimes
Act); id. § 8 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000dd-I Note (b)) (mandating that the U.S. government
provide counsel and pay for fees and costs relating to any civil action or criminal prosecution re-
lating to the detention or interrogation of suspected terrorists); see also Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 § 1004, 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd-1 Note (a) (2006) (establishing as a defense that the individual
did not know that the practices were illegal, and establishing "[g]ood faith reliance on advice of
counsel" as an important factor in the defense).
282. But see R. Jeffrey Smith, Worried CIA Officers Buy Legal Insurance, WASH. POST, Sept.
11, 2006, at Al (reporting that growing numbers of CIA counterterrorism officers have signed up
for a private insurance plan that would pay their civil judgments and legal expenses if they face
civil suits or criminal prosecutions, and that the CIA is encouraging officers to take out these in-
surance policies out of fear that "subpoenas could be coming").
283. See U.S. and Mexico at Odds over Tribunal; International Criminal Court Pact Seen as
Threat to American Troops, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at A13 [hereinafter U.S. and Mexico
at Odds].
284. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12(2), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] ("[Tlhe Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more
of the following States are Parties to this Statute... (a) The State on the territory of which the con-
duct in question occurred...."). The Court also has jurisdiction over people who are nationals of
States Parties. See id. art. 12(2)(b).
285. See id. art. 8.
286. See Weissbrodt & Bergquist, supra note 3, at 157 & n.294.
287. See Damien Vandermeersch, Prosecuting International Crimes in Belgium, 3 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 400, 420 (2005) ("[T]he major problem currently remains countries who, despite
having undertaken international obligations, continue to drag their feet and default on their duty
to initiate and carry out prosecution, whether they are unwilling or unable to do so. The ICC was
established precisely to counter such pitfalls.").
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prohibit surrender of members of the U.S. military to the ICC,288 Euro-
pean and some Latin American countries have rejected these attempts to
evade criminal responsibility.28 9 Afghanistan has signed a non-surrender
agreement with the United States, however, and Iraq is not a party to the
ICC.290 Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain any basis for ICC jurisdic-
tion based on the territory where the crime occurs. 29 1 If there is ICC ju-
risdiction (perhaps because a protected person was transferred to a
country that is a party to the ICC), invoking the authority of the ICC
could prompt the United States to initiate extradition of its own nation-
als for prosecution in U.S. courts.292 If there is not, countries with some
degree of universal jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Con-
ventions have a strong incentive to take action to investigate and prose-
cute the people responsible for the transfers, as required by Common
Article 2.293
288. One commentator referred to U.S. efforts to negotiate such bilateral non-surrender
agreements as "a massive, worldwide campaign." See Chet J. Tan, Jr., The Proliferation of Bilat-
eral Non-Surrender Agreements Among Non-Ratifiers of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1115, 1122 (2004). By October 2005, the United States
had signed 101 such agreements with other countries. See U.S. and Mexico at Odds, supra note
283; see also Sean D. Murphy, Efforts to Obtain Immunity from ICC for U.S. Peacekeepers, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 725 (2002) (describing U.S. efforts to obtain ICC immunity for forces involved in
UN "established or authorized" operations). For a description of the agreements, see Human
Rights First, In the Matter of the Statute of the International Criminal Court and in the Matter of
Bilateral Agreements Sought by the United States Under Article 98(2) of the Statute at 4, (June 5,
2003), available at http://www.lchr.org/intemational-justice/Art98-061403.pdf.
289. See Threats to the International Criminal Court, EUR. PARL. RES. 1336 (2003), para. 12
available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/COE1336.pdf (stating that the agreements violate the
Rome Statute and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties); Jackson Diehl, Our Latin Co-
nundrum, Editorial, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2006, at A13 (describing U.S. threats to cut off aid to
Chile and Mexico after those countries refused to sign bilateral treaties exempting citizens from
ICC enforcement); see also Salvatore Zappali, The Reaction of the U.S. to the Entry into Force of
the ICC Statute: Comments on U.N. S.C. Resolution 1422 (2002) and Article 98 Agreements, 1 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 114, 126-28 (2003) (explaining the European Union's reaction to these agree-
ments and the importance of preserving the integrity of the ICC).
290. See Protecting U.S. Troops, Editorial, WASH. TIMES, July 1, 2004, at A18.
291. The Rome Statute also allows the Security Council to refer a case directly to the ICC.
See Rome Statute, supra note 284, arts. 12-13.
292. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 160 (2001) (noting that in decid-
ing whether to prosecute or extradite, a country must consider "the likelihood, good faith, and
effectiveness of the prosecution in the requesting state"); Jennifer Trahan, Trying a bin Laden and
Others: Evaluating the Options for Terrorist Trials, 24 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 475, 495 n. 100 (2002)
(observing that complementarity regimes allow the United States to extradite its own servicepeo-
ple in order to avoid prosecutions in foreign courts).
293. See also Steven R. Ratner, The International Criminal Court and the Limits of Global
Judicialization, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 445, 447 (2003) (noting that the ICC serves to "signal[] to
domestic courts that they should prosecute").
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C. Filling the ICC Gap: Criminal Prosecution in Countries Other
than the United States
Sovereign states have the authority to punish criminal acts occurring
on their territory. In cases of extraordinary renditions initiated in occu-
pied Afghanistan and Iraq, the close ties between the United States and
the current governments of those countries suggest that criminal prose-
cution for violations of the Geneva Conventions will not be initiated by
Afghani or Iraqi authorities. Some states, however, afford broader juris-
diction to punish criminal acts committed against their citizens and na-
tionals, regardless of the location of the criminal acts. Still others have
experimented with forms of universal criminal jurisdiction for particu-
larly serious crimes.2 94 Countries recognizing broader criminal jurisdic-
tion may be more likely than other nations to honor their obligations
under the Geneva Conventions and pursue criminal prosecution of the
perpetrators of extraordinary rendition subsequent to occupation.
The Geneva Conventions contain explicit provisions requiring High
Contracting Parties to take actions when the Conventions are breached
in any nation. All four Geneva Conventions share a common article on
penal sanctions.295 The first paragraph requires High Contracting Parties
to enact legislation to provide effective penal sanctions for people
committing any grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions.296 The
second paragraph imposes an obligation on every High Contracting
Party:
to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have or-
dered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It
may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of
its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another
High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contract-
ing Party has made out a primafacie case. 297
Pictet explains the affirmative duty imposed on High Contracting Par-
ties under the provision:
As soon as a Contracting Party realizes that there is on its terri-
294. See infra notes 295-301 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement of universal
jurisdiction under the Geneva Conventions).
295. See First Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 49; Second Geneva Convention, supra
note 4, art. 50; Geneva POW Convention, supra note 4, art. 129; Geneva Civilian Convention,
supra note 4, art. 146.
296. See, e.g., Geneva POW Convention, supra note 4, art. 129, para. 1.
297. E.g., id. para. 2.
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tory a person who has committed such a breach, its duty is to en-
sure that the person concerned is arrested and prosecuted with all
speed. The necessary police action should be taken spontane-
ously, therefore, not merely in pursuance of a request from an-
other State.
298
Hence, the Conventions impose an affirmative obligation on the gov-
ernments of nearly every country in the world to arrest and prosecute
those U.S. officials who ordered or carried out orders to commit ex-
traordinary renditions which constitute grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions. 299 The obligation is incurred as soon as those individuals
are on the territory of a High Contracting Party, but if that High Con-
tracting Party is a party to the conflict and prefers, it may request an en-
quiry concerning alleged violations of the Conventions. 300 An article
common to all four Geneva Conventions provides guidance as to how
the enquiry should take place.30 1 In situations in which a High Contract-
ing Party is unsure of whether there has been a grave breach that must
be prosecuted, or of the identity of the responsible parties who should
be prosecuted for the grave breach, such an enquiry could help to estab-
lish the necessary facts prior to criminal prosecution.
The common penal sanctions article offers strong medicine to compel
the global community to take action to stop U.S. abuses in violation of
the Conventions.302 Moreover, in tandem with the obligations directly
298. Pictet, Civilian COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 593.
299. See Oren Gross, The Grave Breaches System and the Armed Conflict in the Former
Yugoslavia, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 783, 792 (1995) ("The obligations of repressing grave breaches
are imposed on any High Contracting Party, including a neutral state."); Tan, supra note 288, at
1170 (noting that the Geneva Conventions do not limit the obligation of Article 2 to countries
with some connection to the acts constituting grave breaches). The rationale for these heightened
obligations is that "other remedies, such as those provided by the political branches, are most of-
ten ineffective and inadequate." Francisco Forrest Martin, The International Human Rights and
Ethical Aspects of the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 101,
117 (2003).
300. First Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 52; Second Geneva Convention, supra note
4, art. 53; Geneva POW Convention, supra note 4, art. 132; Geneva Civilian Convention, supra
note 4, art. 149.
301. See, e.g., First Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 52 ("At the request of a Party to
the conflict, an enquiry shall be instituted, in a manner to be decided between the interested Par-
ties, concerning any alleged violation of the Convention. If agreement has not been reached con-
cerning the procedure for the enquiry, the Parties should agree on the choice of an umpire who
will decide upon the procedure to be followed.").
302. Amnesty International has called on state bar associations to investigate Jack Goldsmith
and other government officials for failure to meet professional responsibility standards. See Am-
nesty International, Statement of Dr. William F. Schulz, Executive Director, Amnesty Interna-
tional USA, in Amnesty International Annual Report (May 25, 2005), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport/statement.html. Recognizing that the U.S. government
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imposed by the Geneva Conventions, many States have domestic stat-
utes criminalizing grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, 30 3 and the
principle of complementarity under the ICC has motivated ratifying
countries to review and update domestic laws to bring them into con-
formity with the crimes under the Rome Statute.
30 4
The Belgian court system has experienced difficulty in pursing uni-
versal criminal jurisdiction. 30 5 Learning from the challenges encoun-
tered by the Belgians, 30 6 Germany in 2002 enacted a limited form of
universal jurisdiction under its Vdlkerstrafgesetzbuch, or Criminal Code
of Crimes Against International Law (CCAIL).30 7 The CCAIL estab-
is unlikely to investigate and prosecute administration attorneys for their role in creating the legal
justification for policies promoting torture, Amnesty International has called on foreign govern-
ments to initiate investigations. See id. Some may contend that it is unfair to single out OLC at-
torneys such as Goldsmith for international prosecution as war criminals. After all, they may ar-
gue, he was simply answering a narrow question as to the applicability of one article of one
convention to the case of U.S. occupation of Iraq. Yet it is precisely this compartmentalization of
duties that is endemic in the Department of Justice; each memorandum has a narrow focus that
sorely neglects the larger picture and the profound ramifications of the narrow decision for human
rights and humanitarian law. See infra notes 332-36 and accompanying text; cf Richard A. Day-
nard, Lawyer Management of Systems of Evil: The Case of the Tobacco Industry, 5 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 117, 120 (1999) ("Facilitation of evil can never entirely escape the taint of
evil, despite the bureaucratic and professional rules that define one's job, such as 'just making the
trains run on time."').
303. See ICRC, International Humanitarian Law, National Implementation Database,
http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/WebLAW2?OpenView (providing excerpts of national imple-
menting legislation from dozens of countries criminalizing war crimes) (last visited Mar. 26,
2006).
304. See Mark S. Ellis, The International Criminal Court and Its Implication for Domestic
Law and National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 215 (2002); Jann K. Kleffiner, The Im-
pact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law,
1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 86, 89 (2003).
305. See Steven R. Ratner, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
888, 889-92 (2003). See generally Vandermeersch, supra note 287.
306. See Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Torture in Abu Ghraib: The Complaint Against Donald
Rumsfeld Under the German Code of Crimes Against International Law, 6 GERMAN L.J. 689, 719
(2005) ("[l~n the summer of 2003 Belgium gave-in to U.S. political pressure and changed the
relevant law such that acts can only be prosecuted according to the principle of international law
if the victim has lived at least three years in Belgium."). The original Belgian policy on universal
jurisdiction was considered to be problematic because it afforded universal criminal jurisdiction
and allowed victims to initiate criminal suits. See Ratner, supra note 305, at 890. Belgium subse-
quently altered its universal jurisdiction law to require that: (1) most cases have a "tie to Bel-
gium," (2) the other states with links to the crime not have an independent system of justice, and
(3) the accused not be an immunized governmental official. See id. at 891. These conditions are
not imposed "if Belgium has an obligation under treaty or customary law to submit cases to its
authorities for proceedings." Id. at 892. For further discussion of the changes in Belgian law, see
Luc Reydams, Belgium Reneges on Universality: The 5 August 2003 Act on Grave Breaches of
International Humanitarian Law, I J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 679 (2003).
307. V61kerstrafgesetzbuch [Code of Crimes against International Law] June 30, 2002 BGBI.
I [hereinafter CCAIL]. An English translation of the CCAIL is available at the homepage for the
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lishes universal jurisdiction in German courts for several violations of
the Geneva Conventions and human rights law, including: torture, 30 8 en-
forced disappearance, 30 9 certain forms of degrading and humiliating
treatment, 3 1 severe deprivation of liberty in contravention of a general
rule of international law, 311 and forced transfers and deportations of per-
sons lawfully present in an area.312 The CCAIL is viewed as "an impor-
tant complement to the International Criminal Court." 31 3 The Code pro-
vides jurisdiction for these crimes "even when the offence was
committed abroad and bears no relation to Germany., 31 4 Hence, it
serves to "fill the gaps" where the ICC does not have jurisdiction and
where other domestic courts fail to act. Nonetheless, the Chief Federal
Prosecutor has discretion to refuse to undertake an investigation on a
complaint raised under the CCAIL.31 5 In particular, the principle of sub-
sidiarity may discourage prosecution of crimes pursuant to the CCAIL
under certain circumstances.31 6 The principle of subsidiarity holds that if
the CCAIL is not needed for its "gap-filling" function, then the German
investigative authorities will decline to pursue the complaint.317 If judi-
Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, http://www.iuscrim.mpg.de/
forsch/legaltext/VStGBengl.pdf.
308. CCAIL, supra note 307, art. I, § 7(5); see also id. art. I, § 8(3) (under international hu-
manitarian law).
309. Id. § 7(7).
310. Id. § 8(1)(9) ("[Whoever] treats a person who is to be protected under international hu-
manitarian law in a gravely humiliating or degrading manner shall be punished....").
311. Id. §7(l)(9).
312. Id. § 7(1)(4); see also id. § 8(1)(6) (under international humanitarian law).
313 Fischer-Lescano, supra note 306, at 695. International Criminal Court jurisdiction is lim-
ited to States Parties. See supra note 284.
314. CCAIL, supra note 307, art. I, § 1.
315. In Germany a criminal complaint under the CCAIL may be raised by a private party. See
Fischer-Lescano, supra note 306, at 693 (reporting that the Center for Constitutional Rights
(CCR) raised a complaint under the CCAIL alleging war crimes on behalf of several of victims of
torture at Abu Ghraib); see also Criminal Indictment Against Donald Rumsfeld et al., at 69-73
(Nov. 30, 2004), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september-llth/docs/German
_COMPLAINTEnglishVersion.pdf [hereinafter CCR Criminal Indictment] (describing the
plaintiffs in the case) (English translation).
3 16. See Fischer-Lescano, supra note 306, at 710 (explaining that the Chief Federal Prosecu-
tor declined to investigate the Abu Ghraib complaint primarily on this basis). Nonetheless, some
procedural opportunities remain to pursue the complaint. See id. at 716-18 (describing the "in-
dictment enforcement procedure" and potential review by Germany's Constitutional Court).
317. See Letter from General Prosecuting Attorney of the Federal Court to Wolfgang Kaleck,
Attorney for Complainants 3 (Feb. 10, 2005), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/
september.l lth/docs/german-appeal-english tran.pdf [hereinafter German Prosecutor's Dis-
missal] (English translation). The letter states:
The aim of CCAIL is to close gaps in punishability and criminal prosecution. This
must, however, occur in the framework of non-interference in the affairs of foreign
countries.... Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the ICC is subsidiary with respect to
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cial proceedings have not commenced in a more appropriate forum,
however, other prudential concerns are less important. 318 Prosecutorial
discretion in Germany is guided in part by political concerns, however,
and therefore prosecutors may be reluctant to pursue transnational
criminal cases.319 Also, in some civil law jurisdictions with universal ju-
risdiction provisions in their domestic law, prosecutorial discretion is
subordinated to the conclusions of an investigating judge.320 In Spain,
the chief prosecutor has greater political independence and may be more
likely to pursue such prosecutions. 321 Hence, use of universal jurisdic-
tion may be possible to initiate criminal prosecution in civil law coun-
tries where those tools are available. Prosecutions can be brought
against individuals present in the jurisdiction who have aided and abet-
ted extraordinary renditions. Courts in Spain and Germany, however,
have sometimes expressed a preference for refusing cases that have no
nexus with the country in which the court sits.
322
the competence of the state of the perpetrator or of the perpetrated act; the ICC can
only be active if the nation-states first called upon to adjudicate are unwilling or
unable to prosecute.
318. See Fischer-Lescano, supra note 306, at 715 ("[Tlhe only decisive factor is that no judi-
cial proceedings have been initiated in the United States against the accused for the occurrences
in Abu Ghraib and the related concrete charges of superior responsibility."); see also Peter
Spiegel, A Top Abu Ghraib Officer Is Charged, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2006, at A4 (reporting that
the U.S. Army had brought criminal charges against the former head of the interrogation center at
Abu Ghraib).
319. See Fischer-Lescano, supra note 306, at 715 ("Prosecutors in the Federal Republic enjoy
little political independence.... [T]he Chief Federal Prosecutor must function as a 'political offi-
cial' [and thus] is expected to be in continuous agreement with the fundamental political objec-
tives of the Federal government....").
320. See Antonio Cassese, The Belgian Court of Cassation v. The International Court of Jus-
tice: The Sharon and Others Case, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 437, 438 (2003); Judge Marilyn Just-
man Kaman, To Live and Work in Kosovo, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2004, at 5, 7-8 (2004); Daniel D.
Ntanda Nsereko, Prosecutorial Discretion Before National Courts and International Tribunals, 3
J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 124, 133 (2005). But see Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal
Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal
Procedure, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 27 (2004) (noting that "a significant number of countries have
eliminated the preliminary investigation judge....").
321. See Fischer-Lescano, supra note 306, at 715 (describing the political independence of
Spanish examining magistrate Baltasar Garz6n, which enabled him to pursue cases against Au-
gusto Pinochet, Adolfo Scilingo, and Ricardo Miguel Cavallo).
322. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with De-
mocratic Principles, 92 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1115 (2004) (noting that in several cases German courts
have imposed a "judicially-developed" requirement that there be a nexus between the crime and
Germany, but concluding that the courts' "application of this requirement was inconsistent, and in
any event the requirement does not appear on the face of [the CCAIL], at least in respect of geno-
cide, war crimes and crimes against humanity"); see Ntanda Nsereko, supra note 320, at 127 (not-
ing that while the CCAIL allows for prosecution of war crimes, the public prosecutor has discre-
tion not to prosecute where the crimes have no nexus with Germany). Spanish courts have
imposed a similar nexus requirement. Orentlicher, supra, at 1073-74.
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In late 2004, the Center for Constitutional Rights brought a complaint
in a German Court against Donald Rumsfeld and others on behalf of
four Iraqi detainees who allegedly had been subjected to torture at Abu
Ghraib.323 The German prosecutor dismissed the complaint under the
principle of subsidiarity on the grounds that the United States, as the
home country for the defendants, was the primary jurisdiction for the
case. 324 While the involvement of a German national is not required un-
der German law, the prosecutor noted that no German national was in-
volved as either a perpetrator or a victim of the alleged torture,325 and
that "there are no indications that the authorities and courts of the
United States of America are refraining, or would refrain, from penal
measures as regards the violations described in the complaint." 326 Rele-
vant to the decision not to pursue prosecution was the fact that several
proceedings had already been initiated within the U.S. military to punish
alleged perpetrators.
327
While use of Germany's CCAIL has not yet been successful in prose-
cuting officials who are alleged to be responsible for the torture at Abu
Ghraib, the prosecutor's decision in that suit provides some suggestions
about potential use of the Code to pursue individuals who are responsi-
ble for extraordinary rendition. On November 14, 2006, the Center for
Constitutional Rights and several other organizations brought a new
complaint against Donald Rumsfeld and other U.S. officials on behalf of
several Iraqis detained at Abu Ghraib and one Saudi held at
Guantdnamo. 328 German prosecutors may still invoke the CCAIL in re-
sponse to this complaint if they find that the United States is not inves-
323. See CCR Criminal Indictment, supra note 315, at 3.
324. See German Prosecutor's Dismissal, supra note 317, at 4; see also Adam Zagorin, Ex-
clusive: Charges Sought Against Rumsfeld over Prison Abuse, TIME.COM, Nov. 10, 2006, avail-
able at http://www.time.com/time/nation/printout/0,8816,1557842,00.html (noting that the Ger-
man prosecutor dismissed the case one day before a major conference in Munich in which
Rumsfeld was scheduled to be the keynote speaker).
325. See id.
326. Id. at 5.
327. See id.; see also Spiegel, supra note 318 (noting that the Army has filed criminal charges
against the head of the interrogation center at Abu Ghraib).
328. Complaint Against Donald H. Rumsfeld et al., Bundesgerichtshof (Nov. 11, 2006),
available at http://www.diefirma.netlindex.php?id=84,232,0,0,1,0; see also Associated Press,
Group Sues to Have Rumsfeld Investigated, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2006 (reporting that the com-
plaint had been filed); cf Craig Whitlock, supra note 277 (reporting that Italian judges have is-
sued arrest warrants for twenty-five CIA officers involved in an extraordinary rendition from Italy
to Egypt and have said that they will try the officers in absentia if necessary).
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tigating or prosecuting the abuses in those detention facilities.3 29 Simi-
larly, in spite of the lack of reports that the CIA transferred German na-
tionals from Iraq or Afghanistan, U.S. officials may face prosecutions in
Germany for extraordinary rendition, particularly if the United States
fails to investigate or prosecute the illegal transfers, or if neither Af-
ghanistan nor Iraq has a basis to pursue action with the ICC. Moreover,
similar criminal jurisdiction provisions in other countries may prompt




At the time the current extraordinary rendition policy was being de-
veloped, former Chief White House lawyer Alberto Gonzales pushed his
team of attorneys in the White House and the Department of Justice to
be "forward-leaning." 331 In other words, he wanted to see how far the
CIA and the military could go without breaking the law, and how far the
law could be stretched to move the line farther forward still. One mem-
ber of that team was Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith. He
wrote a "forward-leaning" memorandum that distorted the meaning of
the Geneva Civilian Convention in an attempt to carve gaping excep-
tions out of Article 49's absolute prohibition on forcible transfers, re-
sulting in extraordinary rendition of individuals from Iraq which consti-
tuted grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and war crimes under
the federal War Crimes Act.332 The Goldsmith memorandum demon-
strates the effect of this "forward-leaning" approach: clear statutory and
treaty directives are distorted and manipulated to reach conclusions that
may presumably have a policy justification, but certainly lack a valid
legal foundation.
In the context of recently released White House memoranda relating
to torture, some commentators have recalled that attorneys providing
advice to a client regarding how to circumvent the law may be held
329. See Zagorin, supra note 324 (noting that Rumsfeld's resignation makes prosecution eas-
ier because he will lose immunity, and because the Military Commissions Act demonstrates that
there likely will be no prosecutions in the United States for Rumsfeld's alleged war crimes).
330. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization: The Com-
ing Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 211, 281 (2005) (noting that in the past decade universal juris-
diction has been used to prosecute foreign nationals in ten countries).
331. Isikoffet al., supra note 134.
332. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 2340A (2000).
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complicit in the resulting criminal conduct.333 Moreover, such attorneys
may be violating their professional obligations to make a good faith ef-
fort to determine the scope of the law, and to refer to relevant moral and
ethical considerations when giving advice. 334 A recent comment by two
editors of the American Journal of International Law took note of the
unique responsibilities of government attorneys, and suggested that the
lawyers behind the torture memoranda had shirked those responsibili-
ties.335 Also, government lawyers who provide legal cover for illegal
acts foster a dangerous lack of conscience among the officials responsi-
ble for implementing government policy.336 If U.S. prosecutors take no
action to investigate and prosecute the government officials responsible
for the illegal transfers of protected persons from Afghanistan and Iraq,
it will be up to prosecutors in other countries to hold those officials to
the standards of international humanitarian law.
333. See Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture,
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 689, 693 94 (2004); see also Harold Hongju Koh, A World Without Torture,
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 641, 654-57 (2005) (describing the ethical implications of the By-
bee memorandum); Lederman, Part I, supra note 272 (arguing that the lack of rigorous review of
the arguments set forth in OLC memoranda provides evidence that the OLC was attempting to
provide legal cover for government actors).
334. See Bilder & Vagts, supra note 333, at 692-93; see also Julie Angell, Ethics, Torture,
and Marginal Memoranda at the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 557
(2005) (examining whether the OLC memoranda violate the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct).
335. See Bilder & Vagts, supra note 333, at 693-94.
336. See CBS News: CIA Flying Suspects to Torture? (CBS television broadcast Mar. 6,
2005), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/04/60minutes/main678155.shtml
(quoting Michael Scheuer, former CIA counterterrorism official); see also Dep't of Defense Ap-
propriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, tit. X, § 1004, 119 Stat. 2680, 2740 (2005) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd Note) (protecting U.S. personnel who, in good faith, rely on legal advice to
conclude that their actions were not unlawful).
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